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 Over the past two decades, a combination of social movement activists, 
academics, and developing countries have mounted a formidable critique of 
international organizations like the World Trade Organization.  The bill of 
particulars is by now familiar to most observers:  the neo-liberal formula of open 
markets, export-oriented economic growth, low budget deficits, minimal state 
intervention in the economy, deregulation, and privatization proved a disaster 
for most of the developing countries to which it was applied.1  The damage, 
while particularly acute in the developing world, was not limited to that realm.  
The critics have argued that even democracies in the western world have 
suffered at the hands of international organizations.  Allegedly, such 
organizations sacrificed domestic concern for social and economic inequalities 
and environmental protection to the false regulatory imperatives of the global 
market.  
 The critique has been accompanied by a call for greater involvement, 
within international organizations, of civil society.2  For some, civil society means 
all associations between the state and the market.  For the most disapproving 
voices, however, civil society includes only social and environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) that strive to improve material conditions 
for the world's poor and protect the environment, not groups of firms and other 
market participants that seek to advance the economic interests of their 
members.  The remedy is to curb the broad powers exercised by national 
ministers, international bureaucrats, and multinational corporations with the 
right of civil society to participate in and directly influence the decisionmaking of 
global institutions. 
 Advocates of civil society participation have already triggered a series of 
reforms of international organizations.  A number of other reforms have not yet 
been adopted but are being promoted, vigorously, by academics and activists 
alike.  Yet the justification for such far-reaching change, apart from the impulse 
to replace the present, state-centered configuration of international organizations 
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with something different, is unclear.  Why are associations outside the state 
better placed than trained, career civil servants and elected politicians to decide 
on foreign aid, regulatory pre-requisites for free trade, measures necessary to 
protect the environment, and other, pressing issues of global governance?  And 
even though we might all agree that associations outside the state have 
something to contribute to the work of civil servants and elected politicians, 
what, precisely, should be their role?  If the principal contribution of non-state 
associations is rallying the citizens of the world on international issues so citizens 
may hold their governments accountable, the decisions of international 
organizations simply need to be visible to such associations and those whom 
they seek to mobilize.  In other words, all that is needed is greater transparency.  
But maybe--as most activists argue--non-state associations should also have 
certain, express rights to participate in the day-to-day decisions of international 
lawmaking bodies, bureaucracies, and tribunals.  This Article seeks to fill the 
theoretical lacuna by advancing a normative framework for understanding 
whether, and how, to redesign global institutions to include civil society.  
This analysis of how civil society can contribute to a better system of 
global governance draws on the political philosophy of civil society and the 
comparative law of democracy.  Its first part describes the civil society 
phenomenon in three different international organizations: the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization, and the European Union.  Part Two puts forward the 
moral principle upon which my argument rests:  liberal democracy.  The next 
part sets the stage for the discussion of contemporary liberal theories of civil 
society by reviewing the history of the concept.  Part Four critically examines the 
four dominant theories of citizen associations and their contribution to the good 
life in democratic societies.  These theories serve as the basis for evaluating the 
pro-civil society reforms that have been made to date in international 
organizations and for suggesting additional areas of improvement.  Yet the 
review of the literature also demonstrates, somewhat surprisingly, that the 
political philosophers  and the civil society activists are talking past one another: 
the theory does not address head-on the question whether associations should be 
represented in public decisionmaking.  For civil society theory, the 
democratizing potential of civil society lies in collective life outside the state.   
Thus, Part Five explores the comparative law of contemporary democracies and 
shows that interest and identity groups can participate in public life in at least 
three different ways: pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism.   The 
concluding section returns to the institutional reform of international 
organizations.  In view of the premises and ideals that inform different cultures 
of democracy and the realities of politics in the international realm, I argue that 
the public law of corporatism is the most appropriate for today's international 
organizations.   
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Reform of International Organizations 
 This section canvasses some of the recent initiatives designed to include 
civil society--defined as all interest and identity associations outside the state--in 
the governance activities of international organizations.3  The purpose is not to 
provide an exhaustive description but rather to bring to light the scope of the 
civil society phenomenon and the importance of developing a theoretical 
framework that can assist in evaluating current and future institutional reform 
efforts.  
 The World Bank 
 Among international organizations, and particularly among international 
financial institutions, the World Bank is widely regarded as having made some 
of the most far-reaching reforms to accommodate civil society.4  Its efforts have 
extended to the policymaking, program implementation, and implementation-
review functions of the Bank.  Since the mid-1990s, the Bank has issued a number 
of policy statements promising greater NGO participation in loan decisions.5  For 
example, when the Bank issues a loan for a specific development project such as 
a dam, it requires that the recipient government consult with local residents and 
NGOs to design relocation plans and environmental preservation measures.6  
While such loan conditions do not bring civil society directly into the Bank’s 
decision-making process, their impact on national governments and local NGOs 
can be significant.   
 In addition to project-specific instruments, the Bank issues structural 
adjustment loans that are linked to the adoption of such political economy 
measures as exchange rate stability, low inflation, and privatization of state-
owned sectors of the economy.  In 1997, the Bank organized a major consultation 
                                                 
3 This is a working definition for purposes of this Article.  However, international organizations, 
governments, activists, and, as we shall see, political theorists, all define the term "civil society" 
slightly differently.  While the World Trade Organization and the European Union adopt the broad 
definition used here, the World Bank's definition is narrower:  the Bank excludes associations 
whose agendas are informed by the market-related activities of their members.  According to the 
Bank's website, civil society “[refers] to the wide array of non-governmental and not-for profit 
organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their 
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations.” See 
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PK%3A244752~pagePK%3A220503~piPK%3A220476~theSitePK%3A228717,00.html. 
4 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note__ at 134; Kumi Naidoo, Civil society, governance and 
globalisation: The World Bank and civil society, 3 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 173, 179 (2003). 
5 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note__ at 129-30 (discussing World Bank Development Reports of 
the 1990s and World Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework).   
6 See Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society on the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization: The Case of the World Bank, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. 
L. 399, 404 (2001).   
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exercise with governments and civil society organizations to evaluate the impact 
of adjustment lending and policy advice in seven recipient countries (Ghana, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, El Salvador, Bangladesh and Hungary). The five-
year exercise, called the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative 
(SAPRI), was conceived both as a vehicle for studying the effect of these loans on 
a number of welfare indices, such as poverty rates, productive capacity, and 
basic rights, and as a general examination of “how the participation of local, 
broad-based civil society can improve economic policymaking.”7  However, after 
the Bank published its findings in July 2001, the NGOs involved in SAPRI issued 
their own, overwhelmingly negative report in April 2002, criticizing both the 
overall effect of structural adjustment loans on developing countries and the 
adequacy of the Bank’s efforts to address the concerns raised by civil society.8  
Despite the attempts to resolve the dispute, the Bank-sponsored process 
collapsed.9  
 The Bank’s most recent efforts to involve civil society in policymaking 
have centered on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).  Developed in 
collaboration with the IMF and domestic stakeholders, these papers present an 
overview of the economic policies, development programs, and external 
financing needs of specific countries, with the goal of generating a 
comprehensive country-based strategy for poverty reduction.10  PRSPs aim “to 
provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the 
development outcomes.”11  They are drafted through the joint effort of 
government officials, local World Bank officials, private sector actors, and 
NGOs.12  Despite its praiseworthy objectives, the initiative has invited the 
criticism of some civil society organizations.13  These point to instances in which 
governments either failed to consult NGOs, consulted them at the end of the 
drafting process when few changes could be made, or allowed only NGOs 
known to be sympathetic to the government's views to participate in the drafting 
process.  Nevertheless, even the critics acknowledge that PRSPs represent a 
dramatic change from the earlier practice of deciding loan terms in exclusive, 
bilateral talks between the World Bank and recipient governments.   
                                                 
7 SAPRI, Project Description of the SAPRI, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/sapri/saprdescnew.htm. 
8 SAPRIN, THE POLICY ROOTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY (2002), available at 
www.saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf. 
9 See PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY, supra note __ at 144; see also SAPRIN, Letter from SAPRIN Global Steering 
Committee to President Wolfensohn (April 10, 2004), available at 
http://www.saprin.org/SAPRIN_Wolfensohn_16April04.PDF. 
10 See IMF, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm. 
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 See Naidoo, Civil society, governance and globalisation, supra note__ at 180. 
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 Mirroring civil society's role in loan decisions, NGO participation is 
contemplated in reviewing project-specific loans after their implementation.14  In 
1994, the Bank created an Inspection Panel to investigate complaints that Bank 
officials had infringed their own procedures and rules.  The multi-national, 
three-member Panel is appointed by the Board of Governors (composed of 
representatives of the member states) after consultation with the Executive 
Directors of the Bank (the principal governing body responsible for the day-to-
day activities of the Bank) and civil society. 15  Each member serves a single five-
year term.  More significant than the duty of civil society consultation, is the 
right of local NGOs to represent individuals who stood to benefit from the 
project and suffered injury as a consequence of the alleged violation of Bank 
policies.  While the drafters of the Inspection Panel agreement believed that 
aggrieved individuals should be represented by local groups, if possible, they 
also stipulated that, in the absence of such groups, international NGOs could be 
authorized by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors to bring complaints.   
 In addition to these opportunities for civil society participation in Bank 
policymaking, the Bank seeks to foster civil society in developing countries by 
giving small grants to local NGOs.  The Small Grants Program, managed locally 
by the Bank’s country offices, is aimed at “promoting dialogue, disseminating 
information for the empowerment of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and 
… enhancing partnerships with key players in support of the development 
process.”16   The Program distributes seed money for initiatives in areas such as 
the environment, micro-credit, post-conflict reconstruction, information 
technology, human rights, gender equality, and small-enterprise development.17  
The Bank also funds the Development Marketplace Program, designed to create 
a “marketplace of ideas” for development, in which social entrepreneurs develop 
and “sell” development and poverty reduction strategies to program 
administrators.18 
The World Bank's commitment to civil society participation is also 
reflected in certain organizational innovations.  In 2002, the Bank established a 
multi-tier system of Civil Society Engagement Teams.  In the Bank's country 
offices, Civil Society Staff (CSS) are charged with encouraging civil society 
participation in programs funded by the Bank’s trust funds.19  At the Bank’s 
                                                 
14 See Schlemmer-Schulte, The Impact of Civil Society, supra note__ at 405.   
15 See IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL:  IN PRACTICE 89-90 (2000). 
16 See World Bank, Small Grants Program, available at 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/64ByDocName/SmallGrants. 
17 Id.  
18 See World Bank, Development Marketplace, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/OPPORTUNITIES/GRANTS/DEVMARKETPLAC
E/0,,menuPK:180652~pagePK:180657~piPK:180651~theSitePK:205098,00.html. 
19 See World Bank, World Bank Staff Working With Civil Society, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20093777~menuPK:2
20425~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html. 
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headquarters, the staff in the Civil Society Group (CSG) advise the officials in 
charge of particular geographic regions, loan types, and constituencies as to the 
best regional strategies for involving civil society organizations.20  To coordinate 
initiatives at the global level, the Bank maintains a Civil Society Team (CST), 
comprised of staff from the Bank's External Affairs and Social Development 
Departments.21  
 A number of activists have proposed additional reforms that, in their 
view, would render the Bank more democratic.  For instance, some have 
suggested increasing the representation of developing countries among the 
Bank’s Executive Directors, since under the present system representation is tied 
to the size of a nation’s economy.  A number of critics have also called for greater 
access to information for civil society actors, and have advocated more robust 
oversight of international financial institutions by national legislatures.  The 
Catholic development partnership CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis, for example, 
argues that organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund 
should become more transparent by making the transcripts and 
minutes of board meetings available to the public and by 
establishing sub-boards that would monitor decisions made by 
the staff of the Fund and Bank. Furthermore, real democratic 
control over the Fund and the Bank activities is necessary through 
parliamentary control. Their orientations and policies should be 
debated in the Parliament of each member state, as currently 
happens in some countries.22 
According to non-state actors, improvements must continue to be made if the 
Bank is to be considered legitimate by citizens in donor and developing 
countries.  As the Secretary General of the World Alliance for Citizen 
Participation (CIVICUS), Kumi Naidoo, said in his address to the World Bank in 
February 2003, 
[i]n order to become 'an accountable institution that is essential to 
poverty reduction,' as President Wolfensohn has rightly 
advocated, the Bank needs to be willing to bring its own 
decisionmaking processes into line with those it is encouraging its 
clients [recipient countries] to use. . . .  Our vision should be of a 
world where citizens and the groups they chooses to organise are 
regarded as legitimate stakeholders, not only by the public, 
                                                 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis, Time to reform:  The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 60 
Years After 5 (September 2004). 
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among whom they already enjoy high levels of trust, but by 
governance institutions who value engagement and recognize the 
many benefits it brings.23 
 The World Trade Organization 
 The WTO has adopted a number of transparency reforms, but it has been 
more reluctant to improve the opportunities for direct participation of interest 
and identity groups in decisionmaking.24  The Marrakesh Agreement, signed in 
1994, anticipated the consultation of NGOs while leaving the details to the 
General Council: 
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for 
consultation and cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations concerned with matters related to those of the 
WTO.25   
Shortly thereafter, the General Council adopted guidelines pledging to make 
more WTO documents available to the public and to establish an electronic, on-
line data base for the consultation of such documents.26  The guidelines also 
urged the WTO Secretariat to hold periodic symposia with NGOs and to make 
informal arrangements to ensure that NGOs would be able to pass on 
information to national delegations.  The General Council, however, declined to 
take any further steps to promote direct participation: 
Members have pointed to the special character of the WTO, which 
is both a legally binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and 
obligations among its Members and a forum for negotiations.  As 
a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held 
view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly 
involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.  Closer 
consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met 
                                                 
23 See Naidoo, supra note__181-82.   
24 The WTO defines "civil society" more broadly than does the World Bank:  "Environmental 
groups, organised labour, commercial farmers and various other business lobby groups in fact all 
qualify for NGO status as long as they prove an interest in trade-related issues.  According to one 
WTO official, 'Microsoft would not be allowed to attend but its industry group would be.'"  
Mattner, Understanding NGO participation in the WTO, supra note__ at 136. 
25 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. V, 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1146 (1994). 
26 Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, Guidelines for arrangements on relations 
with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, 23 July 1996; see also Decision adopted by the 
General Council on 14 May 2002, Procedures for the circulation and derestriction of WTO documents, 
WT/L/452, 16 May 2002 (deciding that all WTO official documents should be unrestricted and 
available to the public through WTO website).  
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constructively through appropriate processes at the national level 
where lies primary reponsibility for taking into account the 
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on 
trade policy-making.27 
 Today, WTO documents, including documents from Ministerials, General 
Council meetings, dispute resolution proceedings, and the numerous specialized 
committees that deal with individual trade agreements and policy areas, have 
become widely available.28  The changes in favor of associational participation 
are more limited, compared to both the transparency innovations and to the 
World Bank’s civil society policies.  NGOs may send representatives to 
Ministerial Conferences, where they are provided with meeting rooms and are 
regularly debriefed by the WTO Secretariat on the progress of the informal 
working sessions of the Member States, as well as the agreements ultimately 
reached.29  Before they may attend Ministerials,  NGOs must be accredited by the 
WTO Secretariat, but the criteria are not particularly demanding; the Secretariat 
has granted about 98% of all applications to date.30  The number of accredited 
NGOs has grown exponentially since the practice first began--from 156 
organizations in 1996 for the Singapore Ministerial Conference to 966 in 2003 for 
the Cancún Ministerial.31 
   NGOs, like other members of the public, may also file amicus briefs in 
WTO dispute resolution proceedings.  This has been allowed since 1998, when 
the Appellate Body first accepted a number of amicus briefs in a case reviewing a 
U.S. prohibition on shrimp imported from Malaysia motivated by environmental 
concerns ("Shrimp-Turtle" case).32  The panels and the Appellate Body, however, 
retain complete discretion in allowing amici to file briefs and, of course, in 
allowing the views of amici to influence the outcome of cases.33   
 A number of scholars have proposed additional, pro-civil society reforms.  
To improve attention to environmental issues in the WTO, Dan Esty 
                                                 
27 Id. at para. VI. 
28 See Mark Mattner, Understanding NGO participation in the WTO: history, nature and implications for 
developing countries, 3 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 132, 134 (2003).  
29 World Trade Organization, Relations with Non-governmental Organizations/Civil Society, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm. 
30 See Mattner, supra note__ at 135.  As specified in the Marrakesh Agreement, NGOs must 
demonstrate to the Secretariat that their work is related to WTO activities.   
31 World Trade Organization, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm. 
32 See Appellate Body, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
para. 110, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); see also Appellate Body, United States--Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating 
in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000) (holding that Appellate Body will accept 
and consider amicus briefs when "we find it pertinent and useful to do so").   
33 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Civil Society at the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
275, 277-80 (2001).   
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recommends establishing a new advisory committee on the environment, on 
which business, labor, consumer, and environmental groups would sit.   Esty 
also suggests that environmental and other groups should have the right to 
participate in the meetings of the WTO's Committee on Trade and the 
Environment, which is charged with exploring different ways of designing a 
common global set of trading rules that both protect the environment and 
promote commerce among nations. 34  He would give NGOs observer status at all 
formal sessions of the WTO's General Council and other governing bodies.  
Finally, Esty argues that dispute resolution proceedings should be redesigned to 
afford NGOs a greater role:  organizations with an interest in a particular trade 
dispute should have a right to submit statements to the dispute settlement panel 
and panels should call upon NGOs with expertise on the scientific issues 
underlying national environmental rules to participate in proceedings 
challenging such rules.35  
 Steve Charnovitz advocates a similar set of reforms.36  As a first step, he 
argues that the Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on 
Trade Environment--committees that study rather than negotiate and decide 
matters--should allow NGOs to participate in their work.  A consultative body 
composed of NGO representatives could be established and given the right to 
issue opinions on decisions taken by other WTO bodies.  Charnovitz also 
endorses holding public hearings at which NGO representatives could appear.  
In sum, there is no shortage of ideas for improving civil society participation in 
the WTO.   
 The European Union 
 It might appear odd to speak of the role of civil society in the European 
Union in the same breath as that in the World Bank and the WTO.   The 
European Union is far more than a treaty and an international organization; 
indeed, many would argue that it is a quasi-federal political system.  Yet the 
European Union has faced the same criticism, even harsher at times, as 
international economic organizations and has come forward with a similar, 
though more far-reaching civil society response, as the World Bank and the 
WTO.    
 The Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which contained an 
ambitious new set of commitments to monetary union, a common foreign policy, 
and cooperation on immigration and police matters, was a watershed moment 
for the European Union.37  In their referendum of 1992, the Danes rejected the 
Maastricht Treaty, followed by an extremely narrow "yes" vote in the French 
                                                 
34 Daniel C. Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs, 5 TRANSNAT’L ASS’NS 
267 (1999). 
35 Id. at 275-76.   
36 See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 299, 343-44 (2002).   
37 See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW:  TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 22 (3d ed. 2003) 
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referendum and widespread public debate in the United Kingdom and 
Germany.  The Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified, but this popular 
skepticism had the effect of triggering serious reflection on the normative and 
political underpinnings of European integration for the first time since the early 
1950s.  Some objections to the Treaty were fairly remote from the global 
governance debate:  the European Union had assumed many of the powers 
traditionally reserved to nation states, yet it did not possess the institutions 
typical of a democracy, nor did it enjoy the essential premise of a democracy--
government identified with a group of individuals who recognize they share 
enough attributes and principles to constitute a single, deliberating, and 
consenting "people."38  Other objections to the Treaty tracked the critique of 
international economic organizations mounted by the anti-globalization 
movement: the mission set for the European Community in 1957 was the creation 
of a common market--the free movement of goods, workers, services, and capital 
between the Member States-- and this strangely unbalanced, liberal economic 
agenda had the effect of burdening social welfare, environmental protection, and 
other policies pursued at the national level.   
 Since 1992, the European Union's institutions have undergone radical 
change, including additional, far-reaching powers for the European Parliament 
and significant, new transparency and access to documents standards.39  New 
channels for civil society participation have also been added.  The principal one 
is the European Commission’s duty to consult civil society—defined as trade 
unions, employer federations, consumer organizations, environmental 
organizations, human rights organizations, charitable organizations, community-
based organizations, and religious organizations—on proposals for European 
legislation.40  These are the steps:  The Commission describes the issues open for 
discussion, the public is invited to submit written comments, and the civil society 
responses are published.41   This process is to take place largely through the 
Commission's website.  Then, when the Commission issues the final legislative 
proposal, which is transmitted to the other European lawmaking bodies for a 
decision,  the Commission  summarizes the comments and explains how the final 
proposal was or was not altered by the civil society responses.42   In 2003, the first 
year after the procedure came into force, the Commission held a total of twenty-
                                                 
38 See J.H.H WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND 
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 337 (1999).   
39 See Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests, 11 
COLUM. J. EUR. L.  (forthcoming 2005).   
40 See Communication from the Commission, Toward a reinforced culture of consultation and 
dialogue—General principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the 
Commission, COM (2002) 704 final, December 11, 2002, at 6. 
41 Id. at 19-22. 
42 Id. at 22. 
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one public consultations, evidence of the extent to which the new procedure has 
taken root in the Commission.43 
 Civil society participation also figures prominently in the Constitutional 
Treaty, signed in fall 2004 by European Heads of State and to be ratified within 
the next two years.  Under Article I-47, all European institutions, not just the 
Commission, would have to allow civil society to participate in their government 
activities: 
Article I-47:  The principle of participatory democracy 
1.  The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and 
representative associations the opportunity to make known and 
publicly exchange their views on all areas of Union action. 
2.  The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society. 
3.  The Commission shall carry out broad consultations with 
parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union's actions are 
coherent and transparent. 
After ratification, then, government bodies that traditionally have been closed to 
direct pressure from citizens and their associations will have to devise new 
participation procedures.  These bodies include the Council of Ministers, in 
which government representatives from the Member States vote on legislation, 
and the European Courts, responsible for deciding cases brought against national 
governments and EU institutions for breaches of European law. 
 The civil society idea has thus been critical in reshaping international 
organizations over the past decade.  But it is also an idea in flux, whose 
implications have not been worked out fully in the multiple, overlapping arenas 
of global governance.  The time is ripe for examining the theoretical justifications 
for civil society and developing a normative framework that can guide today's 
global policymakers. 
The Morality of Liberal Democracy 
 My analysis begins from the premise of liberal democracy.  I employ a 
standard definition: terms of cooperation to which free, equal, and rational 
individuals living together in society could consent.44  Although contemporary 
philosophers dispute the nature of such terms of cooperation, most would agree 
that constitutional arrangements in a liberal society include, at a minimum, basic 
individual rights (freedom of conscience, equal treatment, property, and other 
                                                 
43 European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 22, para. 17 (2004).   
44 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 16 (1993). 
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liberties) and majority rule in certain domains of public life.45  The examination 
below of the political philosophy and the comparative law of civil society is 
limited to those thinkers and those societies that subscribe to the liberal model.   
This point of departure deserves a couple words of explanation.  The law 
that would most naturally apply to international organizations and their 
relations with civil society--international law--does not recognize liberal 
democracy as a guiding principle.  Over a decade ago, Thomas Franck famously 
argued that a right to democratic governance was emerging in international 
law.46  In making his case, he looked to the practice of nations: their consent to 
international treaties and agreements; their willingness to respect the written 
rules within their territories and to monitor and enforce those rules against their 
nation-state neighbors; and customary international law.  Yet Franck's assertion 
has been contested by many scholars, who point to the continuing existence of 
different regime types as evidence against an international consensus on 
democracy.47  Furthermore, even if the better scholarly view is the one that 
sustains an emerging right to democracy, that right would still come up short 
when matched against the constitutional principles of even a minimalist form of 
liberal democracy.  In international law, democracy entails elections for 
government officials, but without the separation of powers and the full array of 
individual liberties part of the liberal tradition.48  
Why, then, liberal democracy?  My objective in this Article is to reflect on 
the moral foundations of institutions of global governance—as opposed to the 
modus vivendi of contemporary international relations.  The liberal tradition in 
political philosophy, complete with its moral intuitions and its arguments from 
logic, offers one starting point for such an inquiry.  A familiar objection is that 
starting with liberalism devalues other social and political experiences--those 
places in the world that Rawls categorizes as “decent peoples," "outlaw states," 
"societies burdened by unfavorable conditions" and "benevolent absolutisms."49  
My  response is that this Article represents but one attempt at uncovering the 
right and good organizing principles of international organizations; other 
attempts, based on alternative political traditions or on alternative readings of 
the liberal tradition, are by no means excluded, indeed they are welcomed.  
                                                 
45 See Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 235, 
237-44 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (comparing deliberative democracy with 
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy); Jeremy Waldron, Justice, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE 
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46 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 46 (1992). 
47 See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Neo-Madisonian Global Constitutionalism: Thomas M. Franck’s 
Democratic Cosmopolitan Prospectus for Managing Diversity and World Order in the Twenty-First 
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48 See Thomas Franck, Democracy as a Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT 
CENTURY 73, 75 (Louis Henkin & John Hargrove eds., 1994); Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, 
Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1995). 
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Moreover, this analysis is limited to one, narrow area of international relations:  
the common organizations and procedures through which today’s emerging 
regional and global communities are governed.  The normative framework 
developed below does not reach within the state to prescribe how political life is 
to be ordered; it does not carry the same threat of intervention in the affairs of 
sovereign nations as other universalist visions.  The phenomenon of  
international organizations that implicate directly the rights and duties of 
individuals—often without real consent or mediation by the state parties to those 
organizations—is undeniable.  What are the ramifications of one political 
tradition for their relations with civil society? 
The History of the Civil Society Idea 
Today, civil society means associational life free of the state.  For most of 
the life of this concept, however, it meant the exact opposite:  relations among 
citizens through the institutions of the state. 50   Political theorists trace the idea to 
classical political philosophy, most notably, that of Aristotle.51  In the writings of 
the ancients, moral perfection was attained through collective life in a political 
community; all other human relations and allegiances were subsumed by that 
community. 
Observation tells us that every state [polis] is an association 
[koinōnia] and that every association is formed with a view to 
some good purpose.  I say 'good', because in all their actions all 
men do in fact aim at what they think is good.  Clearly then, as all 
associations aim at some good, that association which is most 
sovereign among them all and embraces all others will aim 
highest, i.e. at the most sovereign of all goods.  This is the 
association which we call the state, the association which is 
'political.' [Hē koinōnia politikē which certain contemporary 
thinkers also translate as "civil society."]52 
The social contract theorists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
continued to use civil society to signify political life.  Civil society referred to the 
individual living peacefully in society with other individuals through the 
constitution of legitimate political authority.  In the writings of Hobbes, Locke, 
and Rousseau, individuals in the state of nature decided by social contract to 
                                                 
50 See generally NOBERTO BOBBIO, CIVIL SOCIETY, IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: THE NATURE AND 
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constitute themselves as civil society by creating a superior authority that would 
govern their relations.  The law set down by the superior authority would 
discipline the relations among those individuals who were parties to the social 
contract.  The nature of political authority was very different in the thought of 
the social contract theorists--absolute in Hobbes, liberal in Locke, participatory in 
Rousseau--but they all agreed that political authority was the necessary, defining 
element of civil society. "In this old European tradition," John Keane writes, "civil 
society was coterminous with the state." 53 
Civil society [ koinōnia politiké, societas civilis, société civile, 
bürgerliche, Gesellschaft, Civill Society, società civile] and the state 
[polis, civitas, état, Staat, state, stato] were interchangeable terms.  
To be a member of a civil society was to be a citizen--a member of 
the state--and thus obligated to act in accordance with its laws and 
without engaging in acts harmful to other citizens.54 
In the late 1700s and early 1800s, the meaning of the concept gradually 
shifted to the one employed today, that is, social relations separate from the state.  
The shift is associated with the rise of commerce and the growing capacity of 
markets to organize and shape human relations.  In the thought of David Hume, 
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and other figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, 
peaceful and good relations with fellow men were possible not only through 
politics but also through commerce.55  According to this line of thought, civil 
society was possible both through politics and government and through the 
pursuit of individual aims in economic exchange.  They had reservations about 
the new realm of commerce:  the specialization of economic functions and the 
geographically distant relations associated with the age of mercantilism could 
bring about the corruption of man and the downfall of the community or 
prosperity for the nation.56  Nonetheless, the sphere of peaceful and 
transformative human relations expanded to included both politics and 
commerce.  By the time Hegel published his Philosophy of Right in 1821, the 
analytic distinction between state and society was complete, and the language of 
"civil society" had come to refer, almost without exception, to human relations 
outside the realm of monarchy, parliaments, administration, law, courts, and the 
police.57  
It is important to avoid anachronisms in the telling of this brief history.   
Although social and political philosophers of the nineteenth century agreed on 
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the distinction between state and society, they had very different theories of the 
dynamics of civil society.  Especially for Marx, civil society was constituted 
exclusively by material relations of production.  Human relations through 
churches, voluntary associations, and social movements--considered the core of 
today's civil society--were insignificant in the historical materialist account of the 
transition from capitalism to communism and life in the communist utopia.  
Choral societies, gymnastic clubs, chambers of lawyers and doctors, clubs for the 
abolition of luxury clothing, and other such associations that existed in the 
Germany of Marx's day were likewise irrelevant.58  Like the state, associational 
life and culture were treated as products of their materialist substructure.59  
Moreover, for Marx, civil society in the here-and-now was not part of the good 
life.  In capitalism, materialist relations of production were inherently 
oppressive, and it was only after revolution and the economy's transformation 
into a place where individuals could freely choose and combine pursuits--farmer, 
inventor, tradesman, and intellectual--that civil society would serve as an arena 
for self-expression and cooperative relations with one's fellow human beings.60   
The account of civil society by Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci, who is 
still influential in contemporary European intellectual circles, was far more 
variegated than that of Marx.61  Gramsci posited that the civil sphere was distinct 
from the economic sphere and that this separation gave civil society a significant 
degree of autonomy from the relations of production in the economic sphere.  
Civil society encompassed a wide array of values, ideologies, beliefs and 
voluntary associations, not just those of the dominant economic class.  Hence, 
even though the beliefs and ideologies of the bourgeoisie might be hegemonic, 
they were subject to challenge from other cultural forces.  In stark contrast to the 
theories of Marx, this contention was vital to the fall of capitalism and the 
disappearance of the state. 
In contrast to Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville attributed significant 
importance to associations outside the market.  Tocqueville observed voluntary 
associations of all stripes in nineteenth-century American communities.  These, 
he claimed in Democracy in America, were essential to the success of national and 
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state government:  they were the "great free schools to which all citizens come to 
be taught the general theory of association."62 
Civil Society in Contemporary Theories of Democracy  
Over the past fifteen years or so, the concept of civil society has 
experienced a revival.63  It has surfaced in the analysis of government and public 
life in virtually all parts of the world: Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, 
Asia, Western democracies, and international regimes.  Most scholars in the 
social sciences and political philosophy who analyze this phenomenon argue that 
associations outside the state are key to individual freedom and good 
government.  Without civil society, they argue, individuals are incapable of 
fulfilling their essential capacities, and life with their fellow human-beings--
society--is impossible or unsatisfactory.  Scholars are divided, however, on what 
they consider to be "liberty" and the contribution of society and government to 
its pursuit.  Their assessment of these fundamental questions leads to different 
definitions of civil society and different prescriptions for the public policy of civil 
society.  This section reviews the four types of claims for how associational life 
outside the state contributes to liberal democracy, claims that can be loosely 
identified with four different theories of government: liberal, republican, 
communitarian, and cosmopolitan.64  The purpose is three-fold:  to bring to light 
the reasons for giving civil society pride of place in good, global governance, to 
draw out the policy implications of the theories, and to expose the shortcomings 
of the existing theories in addressing today’s question of the appropriate role for 
civil society in global governance. 
Liberal Theory   
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The liberal strand of civil society thinking is inspired by the transition 
over the past three decades from dictatorship to democracy.   This is what 
Samuel Huntington famously called the "Third Wave" of democratization in 
countries around the world: Spain and Portugal in the 1970s; Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay as well as countries in Africa and Asia in the 1980s; the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.  Much empirical 
analysis of new democracies makes the case that associational life outside the 
state was critical in enabling democracy to take hold.   In these accounts of 
democratization, the collapse of dictatorship was preceded by a rise in the 
number of voluntary associations, churches, social movements, and other forms 
of organized social life, all subsumed under the category of "civil society."   For 
instance, scholars of Polish politics link the fall of the Communist government in 
1989 to the proliferation of underground dissident groups, the rise of the trade 
union movement "Solidarity," and the growing independence of the Catholic 
Church in the 1970s and 1980s.65   
The liberal justification for civil society rests on a vision of politics in 
which the ability to choose freely one's life projects is critical to liberty and in 
which the possibility of conflict among different life projects is healthy, not cause 
for concern.66  The fact that my desire to develop my capacities and use my 
resources can conflict with those very same desires in my neighbor does not pose 
an intractable problem for peaceful, public life or for the basic liberty of others to 
pursue their self-chosen ends.  In the liberal theory of politics, organizations and 
groups independent of the state constitute arenas in which different interests, 
identities, and aspirations can flourish.  A pluralistic civil society is an end in and 
of itself because the many associations of civil society enable individuals to 
pursue their self-chosen life projects; pluralism is necessary to liberty.  Civil 
society also serves the consequentialist purpose of checking state power and 
thereby contributing to democracy.  Private organizations constitute centers of 
power that compete with the state and can thus curb the excesses of electoral and 
bureaucratic politics.  Furthermore, through the associational life of civil society, 
citizens can examine government policy critically and mobilize for and against 
the hundreds of choices made every day by elected and appointed public 
officials. 
The importance liberal thinkers attach to pluralism and the different 
visions of the good life leads them to adopt a highly inclusive definition of civil 
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society.  All purposes and all modes through which individuals combine to 
further those purposes fit within the definition, as long as the organization is not 
part of the coercive apparatus of the state.  Market-based organizations--
corporations, labor unions, employer associations, and industry lobbies--as well 
as families, neighborhood watches, veterans associations, and environmental 
groups, all count as civil society.67   
The liberal model generates a number of prescriptions for the public 
policy of civil society.  Foremost among these, the state must guarantee the 
fundamental rights of free speech and free association.68  Without these rights, 
individuals cannot pursue their diverse aims with other, like-minded 
individuals, and civil society cannot criticize, oppose, and check state authority.  
Some thinkers in the liberal tradition go further.   Michael Walzer, for instance, 
praises the associational life of civil society as "the actual ground where versions 
of the good are worked out and tested . . . and proved to be partial, incomplete, 
ultimately unsatisfying."69  But he also cautions that "civil society, left to itself, 
generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power can 
challenge."70 Unlike other liberal thinkers, Walzer is concerned that the exercise 
of liberty by one individual or group of individuals might diminish that of 
others, and he believes that the state can mediate among conflicting liberty 
claims without degenerating into authoritarianism.  Hence, Walzer adds another 
set of policy recommendations to the basic package of liberal rights.  He 
advocates a host of redistributive measures to enable those voluntary 
associations disadvantaged by the inequitable distribution of material and moral 
resources in contemporary societies--working families, consumer cooperatives, 
labor unions, ethnic minorities, and the like--to further their ends and participate 
in democratic life.71 
Republican Theory 
The republican justification for civil society is tied to the experience with 
associational life in old, western democracies.  In contrast to the studies of new  
democracies, those of old democracies, mostly notably Robert Putnam's 
magisterial review of American associational life in Bowling Alone, have shown 
that membership in voluntary organizations is on the decline.72  In Bowling Alone, 
Putnam demonstrates that, since the 1960s, membership in all types of 
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organizations has dwindled, both in those directly engaged in civic life such as 
the League of Women's Voters and those with recreational or other purposes 
with little apparent connection to civic life, such as local singing clubs. 
This phenomenon is troubling to Putnam and others because, in their 
view, joining and participating in voluntary organizations trains men and 
women for citizenship.  In contrast to the liberal vision of democracy, the 
republican model perceives a tension between the fulfillment of self-chosen aims 
and the peaceful and prosperous ordering of public affairs.  The pursuit of self-
interest and particularistic identities can precipitate the breakdown of 
community—through civil war or, less dramatically, through ineffective 
government, which, unable to provide basic public goods such as clean water 
and healthcare in turn compromises liberty.  In the republican vision, for society 
to be possible and for government to work, individuals must learn certain skills 
and virtues of citizenship--skills and virtues that redefine the concept of 
individual liberty.  And, according to Putnam and others, the voluntary 
associations of civil society is where this learning occurs.  Putnam articulates this 
understanding of the relationship between liberty and good government as 
social capital: in the small-scale setting of the bowling league or the local union 
organization, individuals learn the habits of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust 
that are necessary for all collective endeavors, including good government.  
These habits, critical for organizing soccer games and neighborhood watches, are 
likewise critical for voting for national representatives and engaging in public 
debate with fellow citizens and public officials on the pressing matters of the 
day.73 
Modern day civil society enthusiasts might be surprised to hear that they 
fit within a republican tradition that can be traced back to the classical Greek and 
Roman republics, the civic humanists of the Italian Renaissance, and Rousseau.74  
The analytical concept of social capital, based upon contemporary game theory 
and the strategies necessary for overcoming the collective action dilemma 
identified by game theory, appears a long way off from the republican virtue of 
active citizenship.  Perhaps even more puzzling than this identification of social 
capital with republicanism is the well-known republican suspicion of 
intermediate groups, a suspicion that such associations may command the 
loyalties of citizens at the expense of their loyalties to the association of the 
whole, namely the state.  Nevertheless, the new idea of civil society as the 
incubator of civic virtue necessary for democracy shares basic, common premises 
with the old concept of republican democracy.  In both, the individual pursuit of 
particularized interests creates difficulties for government.  The answer for both 
is the creation of a common reservoir of values and aspirations, albeit through 
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slightly different means: experience in the voluntary associations of civil society 
in the social capital school of thought, and education in civic and moral virtues in 
the republican one. 
Republican theory, more selective than liberal theory in defining the 
ambit of civil society, generally excludes two types of associations whose aims 
and internal structure are such that they cannot serve as incubators of the 
reciprocity and trust skills necessary to the pursuit of public aims.  The first are 
market actors--corporations, partnerships, other profit-seeking entities, and the 
small, specialized pressure groups that represent their interests in public life.75  
Maximizing profits in capitalist markets and influencing politics to the material 
advantage of corporations do not require reciprocity and trust and hence do not 
lead to the creation of social capital.  In collective behavior oriented towards 
markets, the material rewards of success are immediate enough that the 
participants need not develop the norms necessary to sustain collective action 
and achieve success in other spheres.  Furthermore, the rigidly hierarchical 
internal structure of most large economic entities enables them to pursue goals 
without developing social capital among their employees. 76  Hierarchy exists 
because those at the top have numerous material incentives to induce compliance 
from those at the bottom.  In other words, hierarchical organizations can rely 
more heavily than other organizational forms on the concentration of material 
resources among their governing members--e.g. the power to hire and fire, set 
salaries, and decide on office space--to induce others to further the organization's 
aims.  Therefore, these organizations can survive without the social capital that is 
vital to other associations.   
The second type of association that republican theorists exclude from the 
ambit of civil society is the specialized organization that focuses on political 
advocacy and that has neither a rank-and-file membership nor the capacity to 
mobilize large numbers of individuals when necessary.77  Like firms, the internal 
dynamics of small pressure groups, whether they fall into the private- or public-
interest categories, are not conducive to building social capital and fostering 
civic-minded individuals.  That is because the professionals who staff the 
national offices of organizations such as the Center for Science in the Public 
Interest (a foundation-funded, pro-consumer group) or Citizens for a Sound 
Economy (a corporate-funded, anti-big government group) have very little daily 
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connection to the individuals and the interests they represent.  Citizens might 
agree with their political aims and even donate money to their causes, but it is 
unlikely that citizens will be spurred by such organizations to engage in other 
forms of civic action. 
The republican justification for civil society, like the liberal one, gives rise 
to a number of public policy recommendations.  Many of them are directed at 
individual citizens, rather than at government policymakers, on the theory that 
social capital must, at least in part, be rebuilt from below, through the personal 
choice to join and participate in community life and voluntary associations.78  
Some of the recommendations, however, are directed at statesmen, too.  In Better 
Together, the policy-oriented book that followed on the heels of the rich, 
empirical case for social capital in Bowling Alone, Putnam makes a number of pro-
civil society suggestions for statesmen:79  The tax code, through deductions and 
other incentives for donations to voluntary organizations, can promote civil 
society.  Smart urban planning can enable individuals to spend less time 
commuting and more time participating in associations.  Employment and labor 
laws that would allow working parents to demand flexible work schedules can 
help citizens spend more time with their children and become involved in 
community initiatives.  Public investment in education creates one of the 
important pre-conditions for participating in associational life and developing 
social capital.  Local government institutions and procedures that give grassroots 
associations a say in public decisionmaking can create incentives for such 
associations to form in the first place.  Reflecting on a civil society experience in 
Portland, Oregon, Putnam says:  "By opening up to local organizations and 
giving them responsibility, government created an incentive for local 
organization.  On the other hand, the fact that activists pressured the city 
government to give them a voice was integral to that development."80  Most 
simply, government can promote civil society by giving citizen associations legal 
powers and tax dollars that ordinarily would be used and spent by public 
officials.  For example, Putnam cites these pro-civil society government policies:  
the decision of the City of Boston to delegate the power of eminent domain to 
allow a local neighbor association to purchase and develop land in central 
Boston; state and federal funding for a tutoring program in Philadelphia 
sponsored and run by a local volunteer group; state funding for a jobs program 
and a sewer system that were the object of a grassroots faith-based campaign in 
Texas.    
Harvard sociologist Theda Skocpol has developed an important critique 
of Putnam's thesis and has put forward her own--still fundamentally republican-
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-model of civil society.81  Skocpol argues, contra Putnam, that what is 
troublesome about the history of twentieth-century American civic life is not the 
decline in the absolute number of associations and membership, but the decline 
in a certain type of association and membership:  nationwide organizations with 
local chapters that mobilize citizens from many different walks of life in the 
pursuit of common goals, such as the Order of the Sons of Temperance, the 
Young Men's Christian Association, and the National Congress of Mothers 
(PTA).82   
 The decline in large membership associations is troubling to Skocpol 
because for national government to work, citizens must develop solidarities and 
institutional structures than enable them to join together with their counterparts 
across the nation to press for common causes.  As in the standard republican 
account, Skocpol believes that civil society can overcome the tension between the 
pursuit of self-chosen aims and the good life in a society.  However, Skocpol 
argues that in a political system that is national in scope, civil society must also 
be national, for otherwise elites will be able to act without any contribution from 
the broad mass of citizens scattered throughout the nation and disempowered by 
the lack of an associational connective tissue.   Without truly national citizenship, 
elites will inevitably make public decisions to further their own ends and not 
those of ordinary people.  This goes for associational elites as much as for 
economic and government ones: with the current trend toward the 
professionalization of citizen advocacy groups, the post-material values of the 
upper-middle class professionals who staff and donate to public interest groups 
drown out the social justice concerns of the working class.83   
Skocpol's understanding of the contribution associations make to national 
democracy leads to her to define civil society somewhat differently from the 
social capital theorists.   Although, like them, she excludes profit-making entities 
and their associations as well as small, professionalized pressure groups without 
a membership base, she also excludes purely local groups that have no ambition 
to engage in public debate or to take part in civic life beyond the neighborhood 
or town.84   
As for the prescriptive part of Skocpol's analysis, she makes a number of 
recommendations "designed to get broadly organized groups of people into politics."85  
In marked contrast with Putnam's approach, her proposals are designed to foster 
associations that pursue a particular type of aim--political--and that do so by 
mobilizing and involving citizens on a nation-wide basis.  This, Skocpol argues, 
might be accomplished by repealing laws currently on the books that prohibit 
                                                 
81 See THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN 
CIVIC LIFE (2003). 
82 See id. at 26-27.   
83 See id. at 240.   
84 See id. at 12-13, 227.   
85 See id. at 283.   
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associations from donating to political campaigns and that discourage 
associations from fostering political debate among their members and from 
engaging in partisan politics.86  In addition, Skocpol suggests that civil society, as 
well as national democratic politics, might be strengthened by procedures that 
give associations with significant and far-flung memberships a special place in 
legislative deliberations in Congress.87   
 Communitarian Theory 
Communitarian theories of civil society, like republican ones, have 
become salient in contemporary academic and political debates because of the 
impoverished state of associational life in modern-day America.88  Unlike 
republicans, however, communitarians do not simply perceive a tension between 
the choice and realization of personal life projects and a stable and prosperous 
political community; rather, they deny that such choices are ever made 
independent of the wider social and political community to which individuals 
belong.  Individual identities are constituted by the spheres of  family, 
neighborhood, and associations--otherwise known as civil society--that 
individuals inhabit.89  The leading communitarian theorist Amitai Etzioni 
elaborates on this perspective from the viewpoint of society, as opposed to 
individual identity:   
[A] well-functioning society, let alone a good one, requires a core 
of substantive (rather than merely procedural) shared values, 
which in part define not only public but also private proper 
behavior.  These values are transmitted from generation to 
generation by the family, schools, and the community (including 
its places of worship and civic associations).  Moral dialogues then 
recast values bequeathed by earlier generations.90 
Because of this theory of individual liberty and political community, the decline 
of associational life in contemporary American is an especially urgent problem 
                                                 
86 Skocpol also puts forward a series of bottom-up proposals, aimed at citizens and activists.  Chief 
among them is to mobilize locally and develop a solid, nationwide following, while at the same 
time lobbying at the federal level, in Washington, D.C.  See id. at 266-76.   
87 See id. at 289.   
88 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOCIETY, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL 
TRUTHS (1998); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Will the Real Civil Society Advocates Please Stand Up?, 75 CHI-
KENT L. REVIEW 583 (2000); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1995); WILLIAM GALSTON, 
LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991); Michael S. Joyce & William A. Schambra, A New Civic Life, in PETER L 
BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 11, 27-29 
(Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996) (expounding a conservative communitarian view).  
89 See Susan Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L. J. 417, 419 (1997).   
90 See Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
355 (2000).   
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for communitarians.  The personal and collective good lives are inextricably 
intertwined, and both are inconceivable without a civil society that nurtures and 
imparts certain core values.   
Given the communitarian conceptualization of civil society, the 
understanding of which associations count as civil society differs from that of 
liberal and republican theories.  Civil society in communitarian thinking is 
mainly local--family, neighborhood, and town--for only in those settings are 
relations with others so thick and frequent that personhood is shaped by 
community.  The public policy recommendations made by communitarians are 
designed to foster this form of local associationalism.  First, they advocate a 
retreat of the state from social life.91  Communitarians oppose the social welfare 
programs established in the 1960s on the grounds that such programs attempted 
to replace the family, community, and church with the state and public 
bureaucracies and that, in doing so, undermined America's social fabric.  Many 
believe that legislation like Aid to Families with Dependent Children did more to 
harm than to improve the individual life chances of welfare recipients.  By 
returning social responsibility to families and local communities, reformers on 
the right believe that their particular form of civil society will be revived.  
Second, to the extent that federal and state governments continue to exercise 
authority in areas such as welfare and education, communitarian reformers 
argue that the tax dollars and legal powers of the state should go directly to local 
charities, churches, and communities.   This would be achieved through policy 
instruments such as tax deductions for donations to charities92 and federal grants 
to churches and local philanthropic associations that provide social services.93   
As Skocpol notes, the communitarian and social capital schools of 
thought share a certain affinity.94  Both communitarians and social capitalists 
argue that good government is predicated upon the thick, interpersonal relations 
that are found most often at the local level;  therefore both gravitate to many of 
the same prescriptions for individual action and government reform.  
Nonetheless, the critical difference that separates the two should also be 
appreciated: communitarians identify a specific list of values that the associations 
of civil society are to promote--values such as devotion to one's children and 
parents, giving to the less fortunate, and belief in God--while republicans avoid 
                                                 
91 David Boaz, Expansive Solutions, Washington Post, Sept. 27, 1995 ("The message of 1994--like the 
message of 1776 and 1789, one might add--is not that the federal government should rebuild 
families and communities.  It is that federal government should get out of their lives."). 
92 See Senator Dan Coats, Can Congress Revive Civil Society?, POL’Y REV., JAN.-FEB. 1996, NO. 75, p. 25. 
93 See Foreword by President George W. Bush, in THE WHITE HOUSE, RALLYING THE ARMIES OF 
COMPASSION (2001).  Skocpol argues convincingly that such efforts will simply lead to the 
bureaucratization and professionalization of voluntary associations and therefore will be self-
defeating insofar as they are designed to strengthen civil society.  See Skocpol, supra note__ at 260-
65. 
94 See SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note__ at 9.   
Civil Society and International Organizations 
 25
privileging one set of ends over another, except for the fundamental civic virtues 
of cooperation and trust.95 
Cosmopolitan Theory 
Cosmopolitan theorists--analysts of systems of government that extend 
beyond the nation-state--make yet a fourth set of arguments on the interrelated 
issues of the democratizing effects of civil society, the organizations that count as 
civil society, and the policy measures that should be adopted in favor civil 
society.  Just as liberal theorists are impressed by the resurgence of civil society 
in the Third Wave of democratization, and republican and communitarian 
theorists are troubled by the decline of civic life in the United States, 
cosmopolitan theorists are stirred by the rise of associations and social 
movements that span the globe.  Associations and informal networks that 
mobilize individuals across national borders, focus on global issues, and target 
multiple countries and multilateral regimes in order to achieve their goals, are 
multiplying.96  This phenomenon includes long-standing organizations, such as 
Amnesty International and the World Wildlife Fund, as well as more 
spontaneous social movements, such as the anti-globalization networks 
responsible for the protests at the WTO ministerial in Seattle.  Cosmopolitan 
theorists hope that the new, world-wide mobilization from below can serve as 
the catalyst for the democratization of global regimes.   
 The case for global civil society has not been made with the same analytic 
precision as the arguments for civil society at the domestic level.  Nevertheless, 
many of the same themes can be discerned.  The liberal vision of associations as a 
vehicle for the pursuit of individual life projects and as checks on state power is 
implicit in much of the writing on global civil society.97  And the international aid 
literature relies heavily on social capital and communitarian theories: today the 
common wisdom among donor countries and international development 
agencies is that aid should be given to local associations, not only to 
governments.  The reasons for this policy shift are generally of the social capital 
and communitarian varieties:  by giving such associations responsibility for 
implementing development projects and undertaking social service functions, 
international aid will build citizenship skills, improve the capacity for self-
government, and strengthen communities.98    
                                                 
95 See Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, supra note__at 366, 367, 375, 376.   
96 See RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE 106, 199, 253 (1995); JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY 8-20 (2003); MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 10-11 (1998). 
97 See JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note__ at  169, 202. 
98See World Bank, 2003 Annual Report, 13, 18, 71; UN Development Programme, Partners in Human 
Development: UNDP and Civil Society Organizations, 17, 22, 23, available at http://www.undp.org/cso; 
UN Development Programme, Partners in Human Development: UNDP and Civil Society 
Organizations, A Policy of Engagement, available at htttp://www.undp.org/cso/policies.html 
("Possible entry points for UNDP-CSO collaboration"). 
Civil Society and International Organizations 
 26
Notwithstanding some overlap with the domestic literature, the literature 
on global governance also reflects a distinct theory of civil society and 
democracy.  According to thinkers like Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, David 
Held, Mary Kaldor, and John Keane, a global society is necessary to curb the 
forces of global capital and to ensure that political institutions of global 
governance vindicate the ambitions and desires of ordinary people throughout 
the world.99  In this line of thought, globalization not only creates benefits, but 
imposes severe hardships, to which heads of state and international bureaucrats 
in control of international regimes are unable to respond.  The elites that 
negotiate and administer international agreements cannot ensure that the forces 
of global capital are harnessed to the advantage of ordinary people.  For 
cosmopolitans, it is critical that citizens of one country come to identify with 
citizens of another country based on their shared, human experiences.  
Transnational groups based on rural and urban poverty, the market, and 
environmental depredation should compete and interact with other transnational 
groups to influence public decisionmakers in the global polity.  Global civil 
society is the key to creating a truly democratic international order, for only 
when citizens organize and identify with others in different parts of the world 
can they can assert control over the forces of global capitalism and the illegal 
actions of states in the international realm. 
Transnational social forces provide the only vehicle for the 
promotion of the law of humanity, a normative focus that is 
animated by humane sustainable development for all peoples, 
North and South, and seeks to structure such commitments by 
way of human geo-governance . . . .  To suggest the political 
dynamics associated with these conceptions, I propose the 
terminology of 'globalization-from-below' to identify these 
transnational democratic forces, and their implicit dedication to the 
creation of a global civil society that is an alternative scenario of the 
future to that of the global political economy being shaped by 
                                                 
99 See Daniele Archibugi, Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL 
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transnational market forces.  The hopes of humanity depend, in 
my view, upon the capacities of globalization- from-below to 
challenge effectively the prevailing dominance of globalization-
from-above in a series of key arenas that can be identified in very 
general terms as the UN (and other international institutions and 
regimes), the media, the orientation of states.100 
Cosmopolitans define civil society very differently from liberal, 
republican, and communitarian thinkers.  For cosmopolitans, interest and 
identity associations are not, in and of themselves, civil society.  Global civil 
society is the global people.  This stands in marked contrast with domestic 
theories.  At the domestic level, "civil society" is distinct from "the people": "civil 
society" refers exclusively to organizations outside the state; "the people" refers 
to long-standing national identities embodied in national constitutions, electoral 
politics, and the representative institutions of democracy.  Further, 
cosmopolitans are categorical in excluding large market actors--namely, 
multinational corporations and organizations representing multinationals--from 
their definition of civil society.  Given that global capital is one of the forces to be 
curbed by civil society, organizations and individuals that serve the interests of 
capital cannot be part of civil society.   
A global civil society as an integrated public sphere in which national 
borders disappear and a single people emerges is a very demanding definition.  
It should not come as any surprise that, in the opinion of most scholars, it does 
not yet exist.101  Thinkers like John Keane, Richard Falk, and Mary Kaldor, 
dissatisfied with the current state of global capitalism and international regimes, 
urge social activists to mobilize transnationally and to fight for a more just, 
peaceful, and environmentally sound world. This prescription echoes those of 
their republican and communitarian counterparts, who also exhort citizens to 
organize from below.   
In addition, a number of cosmopolitan theorists have called for a directly 
elected world parliament that would represent global civil society in 
international lawmaking. They believe that elections and a legislative assembly 
would ensure that the voice of civil society is heard by the state elites and 
                                                 
100 Richard Falk, The World Order between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil 
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international bureaucrats that at present control international regimes.  For 
instance, Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss have proposed a "Global Peoples 
Assembly." 102  Yet voluntary associations and intermediate organizations are 
conspicuously absent from the single institutional reform proposed by 
cosmopolitans.103 While Falk and Strauss argue that citizens and their 
associations should have the right to lobby the Global Peoples Assembly, they do 
not recommend a direct role for private organizations in the decisions taken by 
the Assembly, nor does the logic of representative democracy suggest such a 
role. 
The ambition expressed in the proposals for a world parliament is 
admirable but, on closer examination, such proposals reveal a fundamental 
inconsistency.  In instituting a world assembly, cosmopolitan thinkers assume 
into being precisely that which they lament is lacking from world politics: a 
global civil society or global people.  That is, cosmopolitan thinkers assume the 
existence of a global people that would mobilize during elections, vote, and then 
follow and monitor the decisions of their global representatives.  Yet it is not 
obvious that simply instituting elections and a world parliament would lead to 
the formation of such a global consciousness.104  The European Parliament is a 
legislative assembly that operates in what was previously a classic international 
organization, with powers beyond the wildest dreams of even the most 
optimistic cosmopolitans.  Yet the European public has displayed a stubborn 
indifference to elections for the European Parliament and the daily activities of 
their parliamentarians.105  Cosmopolitans do not have a clear vision of how 
                                                 
102 See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the 
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public policy can promote an integrated, global public sphere or how 
associations outside the state can contribute--and, through public policy 
initiatives, can be encouraged to contribute--to the creation of such an integrated 
public sphere.   
The arguments and implications of the theories of civil society are 
summarized below. 
 
Table 1:  Theories of Civil Society: Justifications, Definitions, and 
Policy Prescriptions 
 Justification Definition Policy prescriptions 
Liberal Allows individuals to 
realize diverse life 
projects and checks 
government power 
All associations Liberal rights 
Republican 
• Robert 
Putnam 
• Theda 
Skocpol 
 
• Build social 
capital among 
citizens 
• Encourage 
mobilization of 
citizens on a 
national scale 
 
• All associations 
except 
corporations, 
corporate 
lobbies, and 
professionalized 
pressure groups 
• Large, 
nationwide 
federations 
engaged in 
national political 
debates 
 
• Tax code reform to 
encourage private 
donations, urban 
planning to reduce 
sprawl, employment 
regulation to allow 
workers to spend more 
time with family and 
participate in 
community 
organizations, public 
investment in 
education, 
opportunities for 
participation in local 
government, transfer of 
public powers and tax 
dollars to associations 
• Provide incentives for 
associations to engage 
in partisan politics, 
afford large 
membership 
associations a special 
role in Congressional 
deliberations  
Communitarian Mores inculcated by 
civil society essential 
to self-identity and 
good government  
Family, churches, 
local associations 
Reduce size of state, transfer 
responsibility for social 
services from federal 
government to local 
charities and churches 
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Cosmopolitan  Assert popular 
control over forces of 
globalization 
Integrated, global 
public sphere, i.e., 
"the global people," 
excluding capital  
Global Peoples Assembly 
 
The Implications of Civil Society Theory for Global Governance 
 What do these different theories of civil society have to say about the 
institutional reform of international organizations such as the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization, and the European Union?  First, the liberal 
understanding of civil society has considerable merit and should be embraced by 
global policymakers.  Contemporary democracy is inconceivable without a 
vibrant public sphere in which citizens and their associations have the right to 
criticize government actors.  Of course, comparative constitutional law 
demonstrates that contemporary democracies part ways over where the rights to 
free expression and association end and the rights to privacy and against 
discrimination begin.  However, it is not necessary to dwell here on any of these 
thorny debates of constitutional law.  It is enough to observe that citizens and 
their organizations must enjoy a core of speech, association, and other liberal 
rights if the different sites of global governance are to be democratic. 
The agreement among the liberal,  republican, and communitarian 
positions on the importance of such rights reveals their foundational quality.  
Rights of speech and association can co-exist quite happily with republican tax 
code reform, investment in public education, opportunities for participation in 
local and national government, and the transfer of tax dollars and public powers 
to non-state associations.  There is no inconsistency in arguing that the National 
Organization of Women and the National Rifle Association should be able to 
march and  petition government officials and benefit from exemptions under the 
tax code.  Liberal and communitarian models of civil society are also compatible:  
for community organizations to flourish, they must benefit from freedom of 
association and expression, including freedom of religion.  This is not to deny 
that these two theories of state and society can come into conflict.  The difficulty 
comes from the invocation of rights such as freedom of expression in support of 
certain world views that undermine the substantive values at the core of the 
communitarian associations of family, church, and neighborhood.106  
                                                 
106 Benedict Kingsbury has argued that, in the international sphere, the dominant liberal model of 
speech and associationalism linked to the First Amendment to the U.S Constitution is at odds with 
the articulation of rights and demands by indigenous peoples and other ascriptive groups, groups 
with considerable affinities to communitarian notions of civil society.  See Benedict Kingsbury, First 
Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive Groups and the Problems of the Liberal 
NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183 (2002).  Nevertheless, as Kingsbury 
himself observes, nothing intrinsic to the First Amendment leads to the denigration or exclusion of 
indigenous peoples in the international realm, rather it is the political theory of liberalism more 
generally speaking that produces this result.  In Kingsbury's words:  "A liberal commitment to 
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Communitarians like Amitai Etzioni, however, argue that liberal rights can be 
reconciled with communitarian moral responsibilities.107   In global regimes, 
regimes which, by definition, include many nations and traditions, cooperation is 
possible only if local identities and values give way to liberal rights and tolerance 
when the two come into irreconcilable conflict.  
Liberal theory's policy prescriptions are largely in place in the global 
realm and are firmly established in the European Union.  The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which contain provisions on freedom of opinion and 
expression, and freedom of assembly and association, has been ratified by over 
130 countries.  Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Covenant serves as a source of law binding upon international organizations 
when they deal directly with citizens and associations.108  In the European Union, 
the Court of Justice has guaranteed the right to freedom of expression and 
association since the 1980s, and these rights have been codified in the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.109  Furthermore, one of the prerequisites of the 
right to oppose global policies--the right to know what government has decided, 
i.e. transparency--is becoming standard practice in global regimes.110  
Transparency, as used here, is different from attending multilateral committee 
meetings,  submitting policy statements, and filing amicus briefs:  it is the duty of 
global institutions to broadcast their decisions at the time they are made in 
language accessible to the ordinary citizens so that citizens and their associations 
can debate, criticize, and hold public officials to account.   
Even though liberal theory is widely accepted, its prescriptions are not 
always heeded by international policymakers.  Organizations like the World 
Bank and the WTO have real incentives to avoid their constitutional duties in the 
interests of speedy policymaking.  It is tempting for statesmen and bureaucrats 
                                                                                                                                     
voluntarism and individual choice underpins a model of international civil society in which 
voluntary NGOs (or corporations) are the paradigmatic actors. . . .   While liberal political theory 
has embraced certain forms of NGOs (including civic associations and, with palpable misgivings, 
corporations and industry associations) in which entry and exit are voluntary, it has hesitated to 
embrace ascriptive intermediate groups."  Id. at 187-88.   
107 See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE:  COMMUNITY AND MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY (1996); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE 
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 4-5 (1993).   
108 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 71, arts. 19 & 20, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19 & 21, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 575, 576 (5th ed. 1998). 
109 Case 100/88, Oyowe and Traore v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 4285 (freedom of expression); Case 
C-274/99P, Connolly v. Commission, 2001 E.C.R. I-1611 (freedom of expression); Case C-415/93, 
Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921, para. 79 (freedom of 
association); European Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 11 (freedom of expression) & art. 12 
(freedom of assembly).   
110 See supra text accompanying nn.  (describing transparency measures in World Bank and WTO); 
Bignami, Creating European Rights, supra note__ (describing transparency in the EU). 
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in international organizations to turn a blind eye to state practices that render 
debate and opposition to international economic policies impossible because 
such statesmen and bureaucrats have an obvious interest in pushing their 
policies through at the domestic level.  The same incentives threaten freedom of 
expression at the global level: vigorous protest on the streets of Seattle, Doha, 
and Cancun; on the pages of newspapers; and on the web can undermine public 
support for international economic policies.  Therefore, when given the choice, 
politicians and bureaucrats prefer less, not more, speech.  Furthermore, unlike 
the European Union, members of international economic organizations are not 
all democracies, so the institutions of member countries cannot be expected to 
impose democracy and constitutional rights from below as has been the 
European experience.  And, again unlike the European Union, international 
economic organizations do not have independent courts to which individuals 
can appeal to fight for their freedoms of expression and association.  In sum, 
while the liberal rights necessary for a vibrant civil society might figure 
prominently in the rhetoric and written law of the international realm, the 
realities of international organizations suggest that such rights are fragile and 
extreme vigilance is necessary to preserve them.  
The republican and communitarian theories of civil society similarly 
share one, important point of convergence: in neither do corporate actors or 
professionalized pressure groups that lack substantial memberships count as 
civil society.  In other words, political philosophy offers no support for extending 
policies targeted at civil society to corporations, corporate lobbies, and public 
interest advocacy groups without a membership base.  While the indifference to 
profit-driven actors is not particularly surprising, the absence of any analytical or 
empirical basis for institutional measures targeted at small groups of social 
activists goes against common wisdom.  This is because many of the most 
vociferous advocates of civil society in the global realm are small, social justice 
NGOs; yet in the civil society lexicon, they fall into the pressure group category, 
not the civil society one.   
Nevertheless activists without a rank-and-file might be able to make 
claims on the institutions of global governance on other grounds.  For instance, 
some groups can argue that they promote substantive ends that have been 
unfairly excluded from global politics and that therefore their voices should 
count more.  Or, they might claim that small networks of activists help build an 
integrated, global public sphere and that public resources and powers should be 
allocated to such networks to support their initiatives.  Yet no political 
philosophy, not even cosmopolitan theory, articulates these hypotheses.  The 
case for networks and associations of activists that focus on promoting their 
public interest agendas rather than building broad-based, grassroots 
constituencies has not been made. 
Although republican and communitarians thinkers can agree on which 
actors to exclude from civil society, their affirmative definitions of civil society 
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and their related policy prescriptions differ considerably.  Social capital and 
communitarian theory part ways with the national republican view.  Both Robert 
Putnam and Amitai Etzioni stress local forms of associationalism while Theda 
Skocpol argues that large, diverse membership organizations are the backbone of 
American democracy.111  International organizations have already taken on 
board, grosso modo, the prescriptions of the social capital and communitarian 
lines of analysis, especially institutions like the World Bank whose policies are 
targeted at the local or regional levels and whose mission is development.  By 
involving local NGOs in loan management and giving small grants to NGOs, the 
World Bank and other international development organizations are clearly 
building upon the insights of thinkers like Putnam.  Funding local associations, 
allowing them to participate in international aid decisions, and giving them 
responsibility for putting the aid to good use are policy initiatives that follow 
closely the prescriptions of the social capital and communitarian models.  
International organizations and the government recipients of development aid 
could certainly do better, as suggested by some of the criticism canvassed 
above.112  Nonetheless, the institutions of global governance are headed in the 
right direction, and the social capital and communitarian ideas of civil society 
should serve as an impetus for further institutional reform.  
And what of Skocpol’s analysis?   It does not appear that global 
policymakers have taken notice of Skocpol’s theory of civil society.  Yet she 
focuses on a historical phenomenon—the development of a national economy 
and polity in the United States—that bears some resemblance to today’s 
accumulation of economic and political power in new sites of global governance.  
Skocpol chronicles the simultaneous rise of a national government and national 
voluntary associations in nineteenth and early twentieth-century America.  She 
notes the vital role of such associations in enabling ordinary citizens to 
participate in democratic politics: 
Directly, therefore, as well as in a number of indirect ways, 
America's traditional voluntary membership federations fostered 
                                                 
111 I do not address an additional issue that divides civil society thinkers.  Should resources be 
redistributed to ensure that all citizens have an equal opportunity to form and participate in 
voluntary associations?  This is a cross-cutting issue that is tied to the larger question of social 
justice, a question which divides thinkers who otherwise join forces in articulating a common view 
of the role of associations in democratic life.  For instance, while Michael Walzer would use state 
power to redistribute resources and promote certain associations, others in the liberal camp, more 
suspicious of the state after the experience with totalitarian regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, 
would not.  Compare Walzer, The Concept of Civil Society, supra note__at 26 with Nardin, Private and 
Public Roles in Civil Society, supra note__at 30-32.  Thinkers who advocate local associationalism are 
similarly divided.  While Putnam advocates transfers of resources from wealthy to poor 
communities, many conservative communitarians do not.  See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra 
note__ at 413.  The issue of social justice affects almost every aspect of political life and therefore 
goes beyond the scope of this narrowly focused discussion of civil society.  
112 See supra text accompanying nn.__.  
Civil Society and International Organizations 
 34
active citizenship and made a difference in politics and 
governance.  Federations were especially vital in building an 
American democracy in which ordinary people could participate, 
gain skills, and forge recurrent ties to one another--not just locally 
but also across communities, states, and regions of a vast and 
expanding nation. . . .  Over the long run of U.S. history, voluntary 
membership federations have both complemented and rivaled 
political parties in setting the course of politics and government.  
By coordinating and inspiring so many people across the myriad 
districts that elect representatives to U.S., state, and national 
legislatures, voluntary federations have been able to exert 
democratic leverage.  Federations combine state and national 
reach with local presence, the best way to influence U.S. elected 
officials.113 
 This explanation of the importance of nationwide federations is 
instructive for cosmopolitans.  As mentioned earlier, cosmopolitans oppose the 
concentration of economic and political power in the hands of elites who run 
multinational corporations and set the course of international economic 
organizations.  But cosmopolitans also recognize that the global people cannot 
exercise their democratic will because citizens are still separated by national 
borders.  The voluminous literature on the democratic deficit in the European 
Union repeats this complaint.  Without a European-wide political consciousness 
and citizens that engage on the everyday questions settled in Brussels, Europe 
cannot be truly democratic.  One remedy to the cosmopolitan and European 
dilemma, suggested by Skocpol's analysis, is the formation of large membership 
organizations that span entire regions or, indeed, the globe.  Far-flung 
federations that routinely bring together their national members and associations 
might enable citizens and activists throughout Europe--or even the world--to 
mobilize across state lines, just as nationwide organizations with local chapters 
did in early twentieth century America.   Transnational associations might be one 
means of overcoming the tension between central political and economic power 
and local democracy.   
What policy measures would encourage the creation of such membership 
organizations?  Some of the same initiatives undertaken by international 
institutions to promote local civil society could be targeted also at transnational 
civil society.  Direct funding of citizen associations could go to organizations that 
meet certain threshold requirements of numbers and geographic distribution of 
membership.  Moreover, in response to Skocpol's call to politics, such direct 
funding should go not only to associations devoted to economic development or 
social welfare, but also to those engaged in partisan, political activities.  Finally, 
                                                 
113 SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY, supra note__ at 124.   
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opportunities for participation in the policymaking of international organizations 
could be reserved for such transnational associations.  This would not be 
participation in policymaking with mainly local effects, such as the 
implementation and management of World Bank project loans, but rather 
participation in policymaking of concern to multiple countries or entire regions 
of the world.  Allowing the participation of transnational associations would 
mirror Skocpol's recommendation that American membership organizations of 
national scope be given special access to Congressional deliberations. 
Privileging transnational associations in global policymaking is not a 
novel idea.  It already occurs in the United Nations system and the European 
Union.  In the United Nations, large, international NGOs whose policy agendas 
cover multiple issues qualify for general consultative status before the Economic 
and Social Council.114  General consultative status entitles NGOs to receive 
provisional agendas, place items on the agenda, sit as observers at public 
meetings, submit brief written statements, consult with members of the 
Secretariat, and request to make oral presentations at public meetings.  In the 
European Union, the Commission is required to consult advisory committees in 
areas such as agriculture, the environment, and consumer policy.115  The 
composition of such committees is generally weighted towards pan-European 
federations of farmers, environmental groups and consumer organizations, not 
purely national or local associations.  Building on this precedent, international 
organizations should adopt more extensive funding and participation measures 
to encourage the formation of regional and global associations and transnational 
solidarities. 
In making these reforms, policymakers should not lose sight of the local.  
It is important to remember communitarian Michael Sandel's admonition that in 
a globalizing world, local community will and must continue to shape self-
identities, inculcate moral virtues and foster social learning: 
It is difficult to imagine a [cosmopolitan] world in which persons 
were so virtuous that they had no friends, only a universal 
disposition to friendliness.  The problem is not simply that such a 
world would be difficult to bring about but that it would be 
difficult to recognize as a human world.  The love of humanity is a 
noble sentiment, but most of the time we live our lives by smaller 
solidarities.  This may reflect certain limits to the bounds of moral 
sympathy.  More important, it reflects the fact that we learn to 
                                                 
114 See UNITED NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERVICE (NGLS), THE NGLS HANDBOOK OF UN 
AGENCIES, PROGRAMMES, AND FUNDS WORKING FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 6-7 (2d ed. 
1997); Peter Willetts, The Rules of the Game: The United Nations and Civil Society, in WHOSE WORLD IS IT 
ANYWAYS  247-82 (John W. Foster, Anita Anand, Jing de la Rosa eds. 1999). 
115 See Bignami, Creating European Rights, supra note__ at __.   
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love humanity not in general but through its particular 
expressions.   
But even though a global neighborhood lacks the intimacy of the local, the 
current historical circumstances of globalization and the vital role of 
cosmopolitan solidarities in transforming international regimes into 
transnational democracies, cannot be ignored. 
The different theories of civil society contain important lessons for the 
organization of global political life.  Yet, in the final analysis, the philosophers 
and activists of civil society are talking past one another.  Philosophers of civil 
society focus on the value of associational life free of the state.  The theories 
explain the importance of voluntary associations for political life in a democracy, 
exhort citizens to join such associations, and recommend government measures 
designed to promote their preferred forms of voluntary associations.  However, 
they do not develop a model of how civil society should shape democratic 
decisionmaking nor do they articulate a series of institutional reforms that would 
enact that model.  Should associations demonstrate and write press articles, run 
election campaigns, lobby legislators, sit on government committees, comment 
on proposals for legislative and administrative action, or sue government 
officials in court?  The political  philosophy does not address this series of 
questions.  Yet this is what the political debate in the different systems of global 
governance is all about: how should associations outside the state, acting in an 
integrated, cosmopolitan political space, inform public decisionmaking?  For 
guidance we must look elsewhere. 
The Comparative Law of Democracy 
For inspiration on civil society's place in democratic institutions, we 
should look beyond the political philosophy to the comparative law of 
democracies.116  The constitutions of contemporary democracies follow one of 
                                                 
116 Even when the question is reframed as “How do interest and identity groups fit with the 
procedural requirements of democracy?” political philosophy is largely unhelpful.  On this issue, 
contemporary thinkers take opposite views.  Civic republicans and deliberative democrats oppose 
interest groups and identity politics in favor of deliberation among all citizens based on broadly 
shared principles.  According to thinkers such as Cass Sunstein, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis 
Thompson, public decisions should be made through appeal to commonly accepted reasons, not 
through bargains among competing interests or conflicting identities.  See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 13-36 (2004).  In their view, enlightened majority rule 
is guaranteed through the collective process of defining and redefining a shared set of values and 
morals.  By contrast, in Schumpeter's model of democracy, politicians vie for the support of voters 
and interest groups play an important, benign role in serving as intermediaries between politicians 
and voters.  Interest groups facilitate the competitive democratic process.  See DAVID HELD, MODELS 
OF DEMOCRACY 185-91 (1996).  My  resort to the comparative law of democracy is, in part, a product 
of the “conventionalist” or “hermeneutic” turn in contemporary philosophy.    See MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra 
note__; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).  This movement away from 
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three patterns:  pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism. 117  In pluralism, 
multiple, competing interest groups have numerous opportunities to influence 
policymaking, irrespective of their size or aims, through the legislature, the 
bureaucracy, and the courts.  In corporatism, certain intermediate organizations 
are allowed to influence policymaking because their membership figures or their 
objectives are believed to warrant giving them a special role, alongside 
legislators, bureaucrats, and judges, in making public decisions.118  In 
republicanism, citizen associations enable individuals to engage in the public life 
of the nation through debate and protest, but those associations are not allowed 
to take part directly in making public decisions.   
International policymakers should appreciate that even though their 
historical circumstances are novel, they do not act in a political or institutional 
void in deciding on associational participation in global governance.  Their 
predilections for interest accommodation in the global realm are shaped by their 
experiences in their distinct pluralist, corporatist, and republican democracies.  
Even more important than self-awareness of national bias is what policymakers 
                                                                                                                                     
deontological, deductive truths and towards more historically and culturally situated moralities 
came as a reaction to Rawls’s Theory of Justice.  By emphasizing the diversity of national experiences 
with liberal democracy, yet only considering liberal societies, I strike an uneasy balance between 
these two positions.  But it is no more unstable than the balance struck in many of today’s great 
works of political theory.  See, e.g., JOHN TOMASI, LIBERALISM BEYOND JUSTICE: CITIZENS, SOCIETY AND 
THE BOUNDARIES OF POLITICAL THEORY (2001) (criticizing Rawls’s attempt to accommodate his 
conventionalist critics in Political Liberalism).  Moreover, comparative law—as compared to political 
theory--has the great advantage of concreteness; the level of analysis is specific enough to assist 
international policymakers with the details of institutional design. 
117 See, e.g., Paul S. Adams, Is There a New Century of Corporatism? in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 17, 28 (Howard Wiarda ed., 3d ed. 2002); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF 
DEMOCRACY 197-232 (1996); Arendt Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and 
Performance, in THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES 171 (1999); YVES MÉNY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN WESTERN 
EUROPE 151-56 (Janet Lloyd trans. 2d ed. 1993); Philippe C. Schmitter, Still the Century of 
Corporatism?, 36 REV. OF POL. 85, 93-94 (1974); GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS (1990).  Most 
political scientists distinguish only between corporatist and pluralist systems.  However, some go 
further and differentiate between systems in which interest groups are assured access to official 
decisionmaking (pluralism or corporatism) and systems in which interest groups are 
heterogeneous and competitive but generally are not allowed to influence government 
policymaking (called here "republicanism").  See Vivien A. Schmidt, Europeanization of National 
Democracies: The Differential Impact on Simple and Compound Polities, 13 POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE 113, 
115-116 (distinguishing between "compound" and "simple" polities); POLICY STYLES IN WESTERN 
EUROPE (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1982) (characterizing French government as closed to interests and 
ready to impose policy choices and German government as open to interests and eager to obtain 
social consensus). 
118 While most corporatist theorists focus on intermediate associations of capital and labor, the 
corporatist relationship between state and society extends to the associations that have become 
salient in the era of what Ronald Inglehart calls “post-material” values: environmental protection 
groups, consumer groups, and identity groups based on national origin, sex, and race.  See generally 
RONALD INGLEHART AND CHRISTIAN WELZEL, MODERNIZATION, CULTURAL CHANGE, AND DEMOCRACY: 
THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCE (forthcoming).   
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can learn from the different national experiences with interest and identity 
groups in public life. 
The following sections elaborate on pluralism, corporatism, and 
republicanism by analyzing the constitutions, laws, and regulations of three 
democracies that typify the distinct patterns of interest participation:  the United 
States, Germany, and France.  The ambition of this Article is to speak to 
policymakers, hence the need to enter into the law to understand the 
implications of the different models for the institutions of global governance.  In 
exploring these national legal systems, the reader should bear in mind that even 
within a system, the law of interest participation differs among policy areas and 
often departs from the ideal type.  Moreover, my claim is not that there is only 
one law of pluralist democracy, one law of corporatist democracy, and one law 
of republican democracy.  The world's political systems undoubtedly contain 
many others laws and models of democracy.  But three is a good start in bringing 
to light the different possibilities of associational participation in the institutions 
of global governance.   
The following discussion of the public law of interest accommodation 
also examines the popular theories of democracy behind the law.  Specific 
theories of democracy informed the U.S., German, and French constitutions at 
their beginnings and related, evolving popular ideas of democracy continue to 
sustain these constitutions.  In other words, public law reflects culturally specific 
norms about how public affairs should be conducted; public law is also 
grounded on certain beliefs as to the consequences for collective prosperity and 
individual well-being of different institutional arrangements, including those for 
associational participation.119   That the comparative law of interest 
accommodation embodies culturally specific norms and beliefs suggests that the 
differences must be taken seriously indeed.  That certain beliefs, although 
perfectly credible at home, cannot survive the realities of the global realm while 
others can, shows that a principled choice among the competing theories can be 
made for international organizations.   
Pluralist Democracy 
The United States is the only clear example of pluralist democracy.120  The 
Constitution establishes a fragmented system of lawmaking which guarantees 
                                                 
119 See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 38-40 (2004) 
(analyzing relationship between institutions and preferences, identities, and ideologies); Schmidt, 
supra  note__ at 126-131 (discussing relationship between institutions and ideas of democracy).   
120 Although many other western democracies have a multiplicity of interest groups that are not 
organized into peak associations and that compete among one another for influence, their political 
systems do not afford the competing interest groups the same opportunities to influence 
policymaking.  Among the democracies covered in Arendt Lijphart's overview of political systems 
around the world, it appears that Costa Rica and Columbia qualify as pluralist:  they both score 
relatively high on the interest group measure (2.50), they both are presidential systems (which is 
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interest groups of all kinds numerous opportunities to influence policymaking.121  
Legislative power is shared among the Senate, the House of Representative, and 
the President, each of which is elected by different constituencies and serves 
different terms.  In the lawmaking process, therefore, interest groups have 
multiple opportunities to shape outcomes.122   
When legislation is sent to the bureaucracy for implementation, the law 
continues to afford interest groups a central role in the policymaking process.  In 
the American presidential system of government, administrators are accountable 
to both the President and legislators on Congressional oversight committees and, 
through them, to multiple interest groups.123  Furthermore, the public has a right 
to receive advance notice of rules, give their view on such rules, and receive a 
detailed response to their objections from the administration.124  Because any 
individual or interest association may go to court to enforce the right to notice, 
comment, and a detailed explanation of the rule's basis and purpose, the 
bureaucracy heeds the views of all associations, regardless of the association's 
purposes or membership numbers.  Moreover, courts require that administrators 
apply what Thomas McGarity calls "comprehensive analytical rationality" to 
regulatory problems: administrators must conduct a thorough and definitive 
assessment of the costs and benefits of all possible regulatory options before 
choosing the one that best fulfills the statutory mandate, even though such an 
assessment is sometimes impossible in the face of scientific and political 
realities.125  Comprehensive analytic rationality guarantees that the bureaucrats 
                                                                                                                                     
related to high interest group access because of the division of power between the presidency and 
the parliament), and they both score low on the executive dominance measure (which is related to 
the presidential-parliamentary distinction).  See Lijphart, supra note__, at 177, 119, 138.   
121 See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 78-79, 139-43 (2002) 
(describing fragmentation caused by American presidential and federalist system of government).  
For the sake of brevity, this Article does not cover two other dimensions of political organization 
that can contribute to more or less interest group access to government decisions:  federalism and 
two-party vs. multi-party systems.   Id. at 105, 135.  
122 It appears that the relationship between American political parties and interest groups is very 
similar to the relationship between American lawmaking institutions and interest groups.  One 
recent study found that American political parties, in contrast with political parties in other 
democracies, can often function as amalgams of interest groups rather than across-the-board vote 
maximizers.  See Clive S. Thomas, Toward a Systematic Understanding of Party-Group Relations in 
Liberal Democracies, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS  286-88 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 2001). 
123 See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 158 (describing system of  “multiple 
principals” under U.S. Constitution); Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, supra note__ at 117 (on 
differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government); JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY 257-58 (describing competition between President and Congress for control of 
administration). 
124 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (setting down requirements of notice and comment rulemaking).   
125 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 531 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Public Participation in Risk 
Regulation, 1 RISK: ISSUES HEALTH & SAFETY 103, 112 (1990). 
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will take seriously any objections made by the parties to the rulemaking 
proceeding--including interest groups.    
American law rarely entrusts private associations with public authority.  
Interests and the associations through which they are expressed are considered 
too partial and self-regarding to be able to handle matters of public concern.  
Numerous industry associations set product and processing standards, but they 
generally compete with other industry associations--they do not set "the" 
standard for all the United States.126  Unlike other countries, private associations 
are not empowered by statute or regulation to set standards for the entire 
industry.127  State governments allow organizations of professionals such as 
lawyers, architects, and engineers to set rules of conduct for their members and 
police compliance with those rules.  This regulatory practice, however, does not 
extend beyond professional services to other sectors of the economy.  Thus, local 
chambers of commerce represent the interests of member firms and tradesmen 
but do not assist the state in regulating their members, in contrast with France, 
Germany, and Italy where chambers of commerce are entrusted with public 
functions.128 
Lastly, the courts are open to all individuals and interest groups to 
challenge statutes as unconstitutional, to complain that agency action violates 
principles of administrative law, and to enforce regulatory statutes against 
private parties when administrative agencies fail to take the lead.129  Although 
legal doctrines such as standing, reviewability, and ripeness are designed to 
preserve legislative and administrative discretion and to limit the litigation 
burden on the courts, the reach of such doctrines is very limited compared to 
                                                 
126 See Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or Primacy 
of Power?, 56 WORLD POL. 1, 23-25 (2003). 
127 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking National 
Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional delegation of power to the President, based in part on 
de facto delegation of power to industry associations to set codes of fair competition).  But see Jody 
Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 159 (2000) (discussing new practice of 
negotiated rulemaking, in which “stakeholders” given decisive role); Industrial Union Department, 
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Industry, 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (discussing OSHA’s reliance on 
standards of private standard-setting bodies in promulgating government standards); Federal 
Trade Commission, 90th Anniversary Symposium 6 (Sept. 22-23, 2004), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/90thAnniv_Program.pdf (discussing “trade practice conference” 
procedure in which industry members would vote on rules then considered by the Commission 
and, if approved, violation of such rules would constitute “unfair method of competition” under 
Federal Trade Commission Act). 
128 See Mény, supra note__ at 146. 
129 See Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1721 
(1975) (analyzing expansion of standing to challenge administrative action in 1960s and 1970s); 
Richard Stewart & Cass Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982)  
(analyzing more liberal approach to infering private causes of action to enforce public regulatory 
statutes).  
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other legal systems.130  To take the doctrine of standing in the administrative 
context, litigants must overcome two hurdles before a court will entertain their 
objections to administrative determinations.  Litigants must satisfy the 
constitutional three-prong test of injury, a causal connection between the alleged 
injury and the administrative determination, and the possibility of redress 
through judicial intervention; and litigants must show that they come "arguably" 
within the "zone of injury" that the drafters of the enabling statute intended to 
protect.  But notice that the doctrine does not set the bar very high.  As long as an 
individual can prove an economic, environmental, or, in some instances, 
aesthetic interest, that is remotely connected to the public policy considerations 
underpinning the statute, she may challenge the administrative determination. 
 What are the preferences for public life and the beliefs about the 
institutions of interest accommodation that underpin American constitutional 
and administrative law?  In pluralist democracy, particular interests and 
identities are legitimate.131  In other words, citizens wish to express themselves in 
public life through associations that attend to the specific and highly fragmented 
interests and experiences of economics, region, sex, race, age, and so on, and they 
believe that public life can prosper through this form of interest politics.  
Engagement in public life based on particularistic group affiliations is the 
premise of the political system.  Yet, at the same time, the role of interest groups 
in exercising public authority is more limited than elsewhere.  That is because 
associations based on interest are believed to function simply as conduits 
through which individual citizens express their differences and inform 
government decisionmaking.  Interest associations do not themselves shape and 
express broader public identities, commanding the loyalties of their members 
just like nations command the loyalties of their citizens.    
The pluralist understanding of interest is rooted in Madison's political 
philosophy.  Madison believed that passion, self-interest, and faction--impulses 
hostile to individual rights and the welfare of the nation as a whole--were 
inevitable among citizens and their elected representatives.  A republican system 
of government would be viable in a country the size of the United States only 
because in such a vast territory a great number of interests would compete 
against and check one another in public life.  The academic study of American 
politics after World War II drew on the Madisonian idea of interests as central to 
public decisionmaking.  Not only did Robert Dahl and David Truman observe 
                                                 
130 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. 
L. REV. 1671 (2004) (describing different types of constitutional courts and more restricted access in 
the French and Italian models). 
131 See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, Comments on Part 1, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW 207, 209 (Paul 
Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (contrasting “theory of group conflict that undergirds 
the American perspective on political representation” with the German idea of “popular 
democracy” and the “strong anti-interest group orientation that informs this [German] 
jurisprudence”). 
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the role of competing organized interests in persuading government officials to 
allocate resources and enact laws and regulations, they also condoned the role of 
interests in American public life.132  As long as the rules of the game--the 
institutions that decided which interests would prevail at any given point in 
time--enjoyed public consensus and as long as no element of society went 
unrepresented in the interest group fray, the system would flourish.  According 
to Dahl and Truman, politics would be both stable and fair:  no single group 
would be able to secure control over government and use that control to change 
the rules to its advantage, excluding other groups.  
The normative vision was explicitly questioned by subsequent 
generations.  Congress and administrative agencies were being "captured " by 
"special interests" rather than representing all interests fairly and neutrally.133  
But the critique operated from a normative frame of reference in which interest 
still drove politics, just a more representative, pluralist set of interests.  For 
citizens in the corporatist and republican traditions explored in the following 
pages, the pluralist understanding of how democracy should be organized is 
literally and figuratively foreign.  Yet this category of thought--groups based on 
interest and identity--dominates empirical investigations and theoretical analyses 
of American politics. 
Public complacency in the face of pluralist interest group politics is 
related to a corresponding distrust of elected officials and government 
bureaucrats.  The Constitution splits and shares legislative and administrative 
powers between the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the President 
because of the Founders' misgivings as to government by elected officials, 
misgivings which today extend to the bureaucrats of the administrative state.  In 
the view of the Founders, citizens and their representatives were not inclined 
toward public virtue, in marked contrast with the republican tradition of 
Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Harrington.  Thus, they believed it necessary to 
design an unconventional system of separation of powers.  Legislative and 
executive powers were not allocated to different branches, but rather they were 
spread across both the legislative and executive branches so that one set of 
officials could check the other.134  This checking and balancing by government 
                                                 
132 See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY:  PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE 
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS  (1961). 
133 See, e.g.,  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that small groups 
have an easier time organizing to influence the political process); Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For) 
Madison: An essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 553 (discussing the phenomenon of 
capture).   
134 See Held, Models of Democracy, supra note__at 89-94; James Madison, Federalist No. 10, in THE 
FEDERALIST PAPERS 160 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1981) (1787); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE 
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 190-98 (1967); POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, supra note__at 
513-25 (contrasting the American Constitution with the republican tradition of Machiavelli and the 
English Civil War and Augustan period); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
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officials that represent different constituencies was caused by the Madisonian 
perception of narrow interest rather than republican virtue as the motivating 
force in democratic politics; today, the system of checks and balance is itself a 
cause of the omnipresence of interest associations in American political life.  
Distrust of public officials, in turn, is associated with limited government-
-together with the preferences and beliefs that sustain a system of limited 
government. 
In the system that Madison envisages, the danger is action and the 
safeguard is stalemate, or, as he would have it, balance.  Factious 
interests are to be "broken," "controlled," and "balanced" against 
each other to produce "stability."135  
Interest groups enjoy multiple opportunities to block and stall government 
action.  A government decision like the requirement that a coal-burning power 
plant be fitted with a scrubber represents a number of lost battles:  the energy 
industry unsuccessfully lobbied members of the Senate, the House, and the 
President's administration, failed to persuade the civil servants in the 
Environmental Protection Agency to craft a favorable implementing rule, and 
lost in court.  Because of the numerous opportunities for interest groups of all 
types to participate directly in public decisionmaking, they can check and 
constrain the exercise of public power.  Interest group pluralism is part of, and 
contributes to, a culture of democracy in which limited government is thought to 
be the wisest system of government. 
Corporatist Democracy 
Germany is a classic corporatist democracy.136  The Basic Law establishes 
a parliamentary system of government, meaning that the winner of elections to 
the parliament (Bundestag) selects the head of the executive branch (Chancellor 
and cabinet).137  The Basic Law follows Montesquieu's classic scheme in dividing 
legislative and executive power between the parliament and the executive 
branch, but the combination of parliamentary government and a strong party 
system leads to the concentration of legislative and executive power in one set of 
hands: the coalition of parties that won the elections. 
                                                                                                                                     
REPUBLIC 606-18 (1969) (calling the Constitution "the end of classical politics" and arguing that the 
Founders chose a liberal over a republican form of government).  
135 See Pitkin, supra note__ at 195.   
136 Norway, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Israel, the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, 
Finland, and Luxembourg are some of the democracies that are generally identified as corporatist.  
See Lijphart, supra note__ at 177.   
137 See Helmut Steinberger, Political Representation in Germany, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW 121, 
137-55 (Paul Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) 
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The constitutional concentration of power in the executive branch enables 
elected officials to filter carefully which private associations will influence 
lawmaking.138  In drafting bills that touch upon issues such as pension reform 
and unemployment benefits, bills that are sent later to parliament for debate and 
voting, the Ministry of Economics regularly consults with peak organizations of 
management and labor.  The same goes for the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and 
the Federation of German Consumer Organisations and the Ministry of the 
Environment and environmental organizations.  Moreover, advisory boards 
composed of peak associations of business, labor, consumers, and environmental 
groups have been established by a variety of sector-specific statutes and 
ministerial orders.139   
Private associations influence administrative decisionmaking too, but 
again the law restricts access to government officials.  The same constitutional 
concentration of power in the executive branch that enables ministry civil 
servants to consult selectively on proposed legislation also allows them to 
consult selectively on administrative measures.  Parliamentary laws also 
guarantee certain associations, in specific policy areas, the right to participate in 
rulemaking and other forms of administrative action that affect classes of firms 
and individuals.   For instance, environmental associations certified by federal 
and state ministries of the environment can demand to be heard and to inspect 
expert evidence in rulemaking conducted by nature conservation authorities.140  
The law, however, does not create a right, applicable in all policy areas and 
enjoyed by all individuals and associations, to be informed of rulemaking 
proposals, voice objections, and receive a reply as in the American system.  
Instead, German law draws a strict line between individual administrative acts 
(Verwaltungsakt) and generally applicable rules.141  When an administrative 
                                                 
138 See generally Adams, supra note__ at 17 (stating that strong state capable of "organizing, 
recognizing and identifying what groups are to be included in the policy and decision making 
process" sets corporatist systems off from pluralist ones); Clive S. Thomas, Toward a Systematic 
Understanding of Party-Group Relations in Liberal Democracies, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST 
GROUPS 269, 275 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 2001)  (describing the role of strong parties in serving as 
gatekeeper to policymaking and importance of cultivating ties with party in order to influence 
policy process).  
139 For instance, the Consumer Advisory Council (Verbraucherbeirat) includes six consumer 
associations, three government representatives, three academics, three union representatives, and 
one member of the press.  See Gunnar Trumbull, The Contested Consumer: The Politics of Product 
Market Regulation in France and Germany 91 (Jan. 2004, unpublished manuscript on file with 
author).  In the environmental policy area, Carol Rose-Ackerman notes that the German 
government routinely consults advisory committees.  See CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:  
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 10-11 (1995). 
140 See THEODORA TH. ZIAMOU, RULEMAKING, PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN THE 
USA AND EUROPE 131 (2001). 
141 MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVE 63 (2001).  The 
German Administrative Procedures Act does not cover rules.  The only procedural requirements 
are set down in the Basic Law and specific enabling laws.  The Basic Law requires that rules be 
published and that, in certain cases, they be presented to the Bundesrat and/or the Bundestag.  
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decision is classified as an "act," the law guarantees individuals extensive hearing 
rights before the administration.  By contrast, when an administrative decision is 
classified as a rule (Rechtsverordnungen or Verwaltungsvorschriften), the law 
accords administration significant discretion and imposes minimal procedural 
requirements.142   
In the German system, intermediate associations are not limited to 
influencing government policy decisions.  The law confers upon certain 
associations the power to set rules with ramifications not only for their members 
but also society-at-large--rules which are backed by the state.143  For instance, a 
single industry association, the Deutscher Normenausschuss (DIN), sets 
technical product and process standards for all of Germany.144  An agreement 
between DIN and the German government dating to 1975 recognizes DIN as the 
standard-setting body for all Germany and as the national organization entitled 
to sit in the various international standard-setting organizations in which 
Germany takes part.145  By adopting DIN standards, firms come into compliance 
with the safety requirements set down in consumer legislation.146  The agreement 
between DIN and the German government imposes certain conditions:  the 
public interest must be protected, including public health, consumer safety, and 
the environment; and consumers must be represented.147  Consumer 
representation in DIN is assured through a five-member Consumer Council.148  
Thus, public power comes with state-imposed responsibilities. 
                                                                                                                                     
Moreover, enabling legislation frequently requires the government to lay rules before Parliament.  
See generally, ZIAMOU, supra note__ at 15-18, 194-96. 
142 Both Rechtsverordnungen and Verwaltungsvorschriften are determinations made by the 
administration that legally bind an undefined number of persons.  The difference is that while 
Rechtsverordnungen bind individuals outside the administration, the equivalent of a rule or 
regulation in American law, Verwaltungsvorschriften bind individuals within the administration.  
The latter are primarily orders issued by senior officials and directed at junior civil servants, the 
equivalent of certain types of informal rules in American law. 
143 See Steinberger, Political Representation in Germany, supra note__at 123-24. 
144 See Josef Falke, 3 RECHTLICHE ASPEKTE DER NORMUNG IN DEN EG-MITGLIEDSTAATEN: DEUTSCHLAND 
22 (2000). In 1997, DIN counted 5,734 member firms. 
145 See Harm Schepel & Josef Falke, 1 LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARDISATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF 
THE EC AND EFTA: COMPARATIVE REPORT 76 (2000).   
146 See Schepel &  Falke, supra note__ at 77 (“DIN is given the task to support the Government by 
creating, by means of the elaboration of standards, acknowledged rules of technology that enable 
the reference to standards in legislation.”).  For instance, under the Law on Safety of Equipment 
(Gerätsicherheitsgesetz or GSG) equipment is considered safe and therefore liability-proof under the 
following circumstances:   "The producer or importer of technical equipment may only display or 
circulate goods such that, in accordance with the generally recognized rules of technology as well 
as the labor protection and accident avoidance regulations, the user or third party to its specified 
application is protected against all kinds of risk to life and health, as specified by the manner of its 
particular application."  The DIN standards were quickly recognized by the courts as the "generally 
recognized rules of technology."  See Trumbull, supra note__ at 189-90.  
147 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 76; Normenvertrag, art. 1.2 and annotations. 
148 See Falke, supra note__at 183. 
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As in the United States, associations of professionals such as lawyers, 
accountants, pharmacists, physicians, and veterinarians are entrusted with 
extensive rule-making and rule-enforcement powers over their members.149  In 
Germany, however, this form of regulation also extends to businesses and trades.  
By law, to run a restaurant or any other business, or to work as a painter, builder, 
or in any of the other trades, one must be a member of a local chamber of 
commerce (Industrie und Handelskammer for businesses and Handwerkskammer for 
tradesmen).  If, for instance, a painter is found by his local chamber to have 
breached a service obligation, he can be expelled from the chamber and thus be 
deprived of his livelihood. 
The German collective bargaining regime also gives trade unions and 
employers' organizations public power by putting them in the position of 
deciding matters for workers and employers throughout the economy, not 
simply their members.  Collective bargaining agreements (Tarifverträge) are 
governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreements Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz, 
TVG).150  The Act regulates three components of all collective bargaining 
agreements: entry into the agreement (Abschlußnormen); employment conditions 
(Inhaltsnormen) such as wages, working time, and dismissals; and internal 
obligations (Betriebsnormen) such as workplace bans on smoking and limits on 
workplace surveillance of employees. 151  Thus, collective bargaining agreements 
cover a wide array of matters related to the workplace, not simply wages and 
working time, issues that in the United States are generally regulated by federal 
and state administrative agencies.  Moreover, while, as a general rule, a collective 
bargaining agreement only binds those firms that signed the agreement through 
the intermediary of their employers' association, the Act permits, under certain 
circumstances, the Minister of Labour and Social Order to declare the agreement 
generally binding (allgemeinverbindlich) on all firms in the industry.152 
Turning to the courts, there too German law gives certain intermediate 
associations the right to influence public policymaking.  Although not even 
associations are allowed to bring pre-enforcement challenges to administrative 
rules, as allowed under American law, certain intermediate associations are 
empowered to enforce public interest statutes.153  This form of associational 
                                                 
149 This area of law is called Standesrecht.  The codes of conduct issued by the free professions (Freie 
Berufe) are known as Ordnungen der Berufsstände and violations of the codes are litigated before 
special courts of honor (Ehrengerichte).  See, e.g., Federal Act for Attorneys-At-Law §§ 43 et seq. 
(Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung  or BRAO). 
150 See Basic Law, art. 9(3); Däubler, Tarifvertragsrecht, 3. AUFL. (1993); Löwisch & Rieble, 
TARIFVERTRAGSGESETZT (2nd ed., 2004). 
151 Collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers in the firm, regardless of whether they are 
members of the trade union.   
152 Collective Bargaining Agreements Act § 5.   
153 Only when the rule is enforced against an individual or firm does the law recognize an 
"administrative act" (Verwaltungsakt) that prejudices the rights of a party, which can then be 
challenged in the courts by that party. At that point, the party can claim that the rule upon which 
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lawsuit is known as a "class action" (Verbandsklage) and enables associations to 
sue in their own right, without having to establish that an individual member 
has legally recognized rights that have been injured.154  Verbandsklage have the 
advantage over individual lawsuits that a judicial remedy can be awarded to the 
entire class of individuals represented by the association, not simply the named 
plaintiffs.  Since the 1940s, local chambers of commerce (Industrie und 
Handelskammer), competitors (Gewerbetreibende), and industry associations, whose 
by-laws specify among their aims the pursuit of their members’s commercial 
interests, have had the right to sue businesses guilty of anti-competitive practices 
under the Unfair Competition Act.155  The same associations, plus trade unions, 
also have the right to sue for infringements of various consumer protection 
laws.156  Then, in the 1970s, a number of statutes empowered consumer and 
environmental groups to bring lawsuits enforcing their terms.  In 1976, consumer 
associations with more than seventy-five members and accredited by the 
Economics Ministry were allowed to sue to obtain injunctive relief under the law 
on misleading advertising and unfair standard contracts.157   In 1979, Bremen 
gave certain environmental organizations the right to sue for breaches of the 
Bremen Environmental Protection Act and, in 1980, the Land of Hesse did the 
same.158   Under the Federal Nature Conservation Act, passed in 2002, 
environmental groups may sue to oppose public and private schemes with 
environmental effects and to contest administrative waivers from the 
requirements of the Act.159 
In corporatist democracy, in contrast with pluralist democracy, the law 
permits only certain associations take part in day-to-day lawmaking, rulemaking, 
and enforcement, yet the law also confers greater public authority upon those 
                                                                                                                                     
the enforcement action was based is illegal.  Notice, however, that the range of parties that can 
object to the rule is limited by the requirement of an act directed against a specific party, and the 
arguments that can be used to oppose the rule do not include the procedural claims in American 
administrative law, given the lack of a right to participate in administrative rulemaking. 
154Absent such statutory authorization, associations are not allowed to sue on the behalf of their 
members.  A litigant must allege that the administrative act violated his or her own "subject rights." 
See VwGO § 42.2.    
155 Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act Against Unfair Competition) § 13.2.2; Köhler and 
Piper, Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, 3rd ed., Munich 2002, § 13 note 11 (right to sue of  
Gewerbetreibende), § 13 notes 17 & 20 (right to sue of industry associations). 
156 Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen (Unfair Contract Terms 
Act) § 22.3.1.2 
157 See Unfair Contract Terms Act § 13.2.1.2; Trumbull, supra note__ at 78,  96.  Since January 1, 2002, 
the Unfair Contract Terms Act has been repealed and has been incorporated into a number of other 
laws.  The provisions on Verbandsklage are now section 3.1.1.2 of the Prohibitory Injunctions Act 
(Gesetz über Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechts--und anderen Verstöβen). 
158 See Bremisches Naturschutzgesetz (Bremen Environmental Protection Act) §§43, 44; Hessisches 
Naturschutzgesetz (Hessian Environmental Protection Act) § 36.   
159 See Bundesnaturschutzgesetz § 61. Many of the consumer and environmental associations that 
are given the right to sue also receive large amounts of direct government funding.  This is the case 
for the German Consumer Federation (Vzbv). 
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same  associations.  What are the cultural norms and beliefs that underpin the 
public law of associations in corporatist democracy?  Industry, labor, the trades 
and the professions, consumers, and environmentalists are believed to constitute 
society.160  Membership in one of these groups is a matter of identity and 
belonging.  The fabric of the nation has many threads, some which are 
ideological in nature and expressed through party affiliation and elections, 
others which are related to the structure of the market and production of wealth, 
others which are tied to family and community.  In corporatism, when interest 
groups are consulted or when they are allowed to govern, they are conceived as 
acting in the public interest because, on certain matters, they are the public.  
This ideology can be traced to different nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century theories of the state and society.  To mention just a few of the 
strands Philippe Schmitter identified in his now classic analysis of modern 
corporatist practices: the romantic, organic thought of Friedrich Schlegel and 
G.W. Friedrich Hegel; the Social Christian thought of Wilhelm von Ketteler, Karl 
von Vogelsang, Popes Leo XIII, and Pius XI; the fascist authoritarian thought of 
Giuseppe Bottai and Francesco Vito.161  Some of the intellectual pedigree is 
suspect, but then again, some of it is not.  This form of interest accommodation 
has co-existed happily with elections, legislative assemblies, and constitutional 
courts for over fifty years now.  The less fortunate ideological origins of the 
public law of corporatist democracies should not prejudice contemporary 
attitudes towards corporatist forms of interest representation. 
A corollary of the idea of intermediate association as building block of the 
nation is the necessity of distinguishing between associations which represent 
and constitute broader identities and those which simply serve as temporary 
conduits for the shifting preferences of individuals.  In corporatist systems, not 
all associations are created equal.  Just because an organization has a charter and 
members does not mean that it should be allowed to take part in policymaking 
or set rules for its members, and by implication, all citizens who interact with its 
members.  The organization must satisfy certain conditions before it will be 
recognized as representing broader social identities:  recognition from those 
whom it purports to represent, namely membership, recognition from other 
associations, longevity, and so on.  
The importance that corporatist democracies attach to public identities 
other than nation does not mean that they denigrate the institutions of 
citizenship--voting, parties, and elected representatives.  Although it is certainly 
true that corporatism has been used by authoritarian regimes--Mussolini in Italy, 
                                                 
160 Most political science studies of corporatism focus on peak associations of capital and labor and 
their influence on labor market, social welfare, and economic policies.  See Lijphart, supra note __ at 
176.  As new interests have emerged in areas such as consumer protection and the environment, 
corporatist democracies have extended the old patterns of representation to the new forms of 
interest and therefore I include these actors and policy areas as well.   
161 See Schmitter, Still the Century of Corporatism?, supra note__ at  87. 
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Franco in Spain, and a number of Latin American countries--corporatist interest 
representation is also an important feature of established democracies such as 
Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.162  Part of why public law permits 
legislators and administrators to select the interest associations that will 
influence policymaking is because elected representatives are trusted 
institutional actors.  Today, as the German Constitutional Court declared in the 
case on the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, at the heart of the German 
nation are elections and the Bundestag, the "representative of the whole 
people."163  Because of the choice made in the Basic Law in favor of parliamentary 
government, the elected officials that head the executive branch wield significant 
powers.  They are free from some of the checks of the American separation of 
powers system, and rightly so in the eyes of the citizenry.  As we shall soon see, 
however, the executive branch in corporatist democracy is subject to greater 
checks than in republican democracy, precisely because of the role of 
intermediate associations in public decisionmaking.   
A strong, elected executive branch that commands a professional 
bureaucracy has a high capacity for action.  Once a choice is made in a general 
election in favor of a party and its platform, government faces fewer obstacles to 
carrying out that choice in corporatist democracy than in the pluralist variety.  
Legislation and implementing measures can be adopted with relative ease, given 
the relationship between coalition parties, the government cabinet, and the 
administration in drafting and shepherding the text through the government 
process.  Not as great a capacity for state action as in the case of French 
republican democracy, however, because of the need to include and 
accommodate important social and economic forces.  Again, the ability to act 
decisively in public affairs and pursue new policy initiatives is not simply a 
matter of the institutional mechanics of corporatist democracy; it also informs the 
expectations of the citizens who mobilize and organize within the world of 
corporatist democracy.  In this idea of democracy, once officials are elected to 
office, they should be able to be carry out their policy agenda, checked only by 
significant social forces, because those officials are considered representatives of 
the people and, as such, able to make the right decisions for the nation.   
Republican Democracy 
In republican democracies, decisionmaking is dominated by the 
institutions of voting, political parties, elected leaders, and specialized 
administration, with little room for private associations.  France is the 
paradigmatic case, although even there interest and identity associations are 
                                                 
162 Id. at 89-90. 
163 Brunner and Others v. The European Union Treaty, Case 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92 [1994] 1 
CMLR 57, Oct. 12, 1993. 
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becoming increasingly influential in day-to-day policymaking.164  Like Germany, 
the origins of the French system are parliamentary.  The Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic, however, establishes a semi-presidential system: a directly elected 
President appoints the Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister must also enjoy 
the support of the party or coalition of parties that wins the elections for 
parliament (Assemblée Nationale).165  This might appear to create the possibility 
of divided government, with the concomitant multiple points of access for 
interest groups.  Historical experience, however, has shown that during those 
periods in which the offices of the Prime Minister and the President are held by 
different parties, the Prime Minister dominates.166  The Prime Minister and his 
cabinet work with an elite, professional administration to draft legislation.  
Unlike Germany, the concentration of legislative power in the hands of the Prime 
Minister, or the Prime Minister and President when they are both  of the same 
party, is used more to exclude interest groups, and less to screen them.167  
Different ministries with historical ties to certain groups may call upon them to 
comment on draft bills, yet the process is less systematic than in the German 
system.  The law also establishes a number of government bodies on which 
employers' associations, professional associations, labor, farmers, consumers, 
and other groups are represented and which are consulted in the lawmaking 
process.168  The influence and pervasiveness of such advisory bodies in public 
life, however, is less significant than in the German case.169 
Rulemaking and other forms of policy implementation follow a similar 
pattern.  Drafting is a matter for the administration, with the exception of those 
cases in which civil servants seek guidance from outside groups because such 
groups are believed to have valuable experience or the issues are thought to be 
politically sensitive.  Some of the same advisory bodies that consult on draft 
legislation also consult on important implementing rules (règlements).  As in 
                                                 
164 Other such democracies are Greece and Malta.  This classification is based on Schmidt and 
Lijphart.  Schmidt groups France and Greece together as "simple polities."  See Schmidt, supra 
note__ at 115.  In Lijphart's analysis, Malta score high on interest group pluralism (indicating that 
historical relations between state and society have not created incentives for interest groups to 
organize into a small number of peak associations) and executive dominance (indicating that the 
numerous interest groups do not have access to public decisionmakers because of the concentration 
of power in the executive branch).  See Lijphart, supra note__ at 138, 177.  I have excluded common 
law countries like the United Kingdom and Australia from this list because, even though they share 
a number of features with France--a strong state that bars extensive interest group participation in 
public decisionmaking,--they do not share the same republican ideology.   
165 See FRENCH CONST., arts. 8 & 20;  see generally Mark Kesselman, France, in EUROPEAN POLITICS IN 
TRANSITION 127 (Mark Kesselman & Joel Krieger eds., 1987).   
166 See Lijphart, supra note__ at 121-22.   
167 See Andrew Appleton, France, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 45, 54 (Clive S. Thomas 
ed., 2001) (describing ability of executive branch to control points of access of interest groups 
because of elite status and professional ethos of civil service). 
168 One prominent example is the Social and Economic Council, which, under the Constitution, 
must be consulted on all economic and social legislation.  See FRENCH CONST., arts. 70 & 71.   
169 See Mény, supra note__ at 144-46. 
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Germany and different from the United States, the law does not guarantee 
associations outside advisory committees the right to be consulted.  The law 
draws a line between administrative decisions of general application (acte 
réglementaire) and individualized determinations (acte individuel) and only 
guarantees procedural rights before the administration in the latter case, 
generally only for individuals named in the administrative proceeding.170   
Private associations are also entrusted with regulatory powers, albeit less 
often and with greater government participation than in Germany.  The law 
authorizes a single standard-setting organization, the Association Française de 
Normalisation (AFNOR), to adopt industry standards, which are often 
incorporated in health and safety and consumer protection laws and therefore 
become legally binding.171  AFNOR is composed mainly of sector-specific 
industry associations, but also has representation from trade unions, consumer 
groups, and environmental organizations.   In contrast to the German case, the 
French government directly participates in the standard-setting work of AFNOR:  
a government representative (commissaire du gouvernement) sits on AFNOR’s 
governing board and can initiate new standards projects, comment on proposed 
standards, and veto standards.172  Similar to Germany, the law requires firms to 
join their local chambers of commerce (chambre de commerce), which exercise 
regulatory and disciplinary powers over their members.173 Members of the 
professions must join their national association (ordre), which is responsible for 
drawing up professional codes of conduct (codes de déontologies) and enforcing the 
terms of the code through their governing bodies (Conseil de l'ordre).174  Although 
professional associations exercise this form of public power everywhere, 
including the United States, their authority is more extensive in France: in the 
case of doctors, dentist-surgeons, mid-wives, and pharmacists, their national 
governing bodies decide disputes between their members and patients covered 
under the state social insurance scheme.175 
French law on the right of citizen associations to shape public policy 
through the courts stands somewhere between American and German law.  Like 
the United States and unlike Germany, standing (intérêt à agir) to bring pre-
enforcement challenges to administrative regulations is liberal.176  Associations 
are normally permitted to sue on the behalf of the general interest (intérêt général 
                                                 
170 See JACQUELINE MORAND-DEVILLER, COURS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 317  (7th ed. 2001);  MARCEAU 
LONG, PROSPER WEIL, GUY BRAIBANT, PIERRE DELVOLVÉ & BRUNO GENVOIS, LES GRANDS ARRÊTS DE LA 
JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 355, point 7 (14th ed. 2003). 
171 See Schepel & Falke, supra note__ at 71.  
172 See id. at 72.   
173 See Mény, supra note__ at 144-46. 
174 See JOËL MORET-BAILLY, LES DÉONTOLOGIES 99-126 (2001). 
175 See id. at 184.   
176 See MORAND-DEVILLER, supra note__ at 679.  However, unlike citizens in Germany and the 
United States, French citizens and their associations cannot bring constitutional challenges to 
parliamentary laws.  See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note __. 
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or intérêt collectif) that they are charged with protecting under their by-laws.177  
The grounds of review, however, are narrow since plaintiffs are not guaranteed 
procedural rights in the administrative process and therefore can only challenge 
the rule on the substance, not the procedure.178  Furthermore, the degree of 
judicial interference with the government's findings on the substance is not 
particularly extensive since the government is allowed significant discretion in 
the rulemaking context.179  
 Again, with respect to associational enforcement of public interest 
statutes, the French system also falls somewhere in between the American and 
German systems.  The law puts into place a number of cross-cutting 
requirements that associations must satisfy before they can bring suit.  Since 
there are requirements, the litigation opportunities are not as significant as in the 
American system; but since the requirements are cross-cutting, and not tied to 
particular regulatory statutes, the litigation opportunities are greater than in the 
German system.  Traditionally, associations were allowed to sue to protect their 
property rights and to represent the legal interests of their members--in common 
law parlance, a claim sounding in tort, contract, or property--but not to vindicate 
the broader public interest goals contained in laws.  Only the public prosecutor 
was recognized as the legitimate spokesman for the public interest.  As one 
standard text on the subject puts it: 
Before, judges did not want to give to groups that were not 
necessarily representative the power to represent the collectivity.  
Generally speaking, they feared that civil actions, brought before 
the courts by single associations, would encroach upon the 
powers of the public prosecutor.180 
Beginning in the early 1970s, judicial resistance to associational litigation 
gave way to a more liberal approach and now associations are allowed to sue if 
the interest being vindicated is consistent with their purposes under their by-
laws (statuts) and as declared to the public authorities.181  For instance, in 1971, a 
Holocaust remembrance group (Reseau de Souvenir) petitioned to join, as a civil 
party, a criminal prosecution against Le Pen for publishing material favorable to 
Hitler and the Nazis.  Reseau de Souvenir was registered with the Ministry of 
Interior as a public purpose association (association d'utilité publique) created to 
protect the memories of those murdered in concentration camps.  The Court of 
Cassation decided in favor of Reseau de Souvenir, even though Reseau had 
failed to prove that any single member suffered injury from Le Pen's publication 
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and even though Reseau's injury was indistinguishable from that of its 
members.182  
A number of laws have also specifically recognized the right of 
associations to litigate in the public interest:  environmental organizations, 
consumer organizations, animal rights groups, and civil liberties groups.183  
These laws, however, all impose additional conditions beyond the courts' 
requirement that associations be registered as public purpose associations whose 
aims are related to the interests protected by the statute.  For instance, consumer 
groups must demonstrate at least one year of existence and "effective and public 
activity" in defense of consumer interests.  Furthermore, national consumer 
associations must have at least 10,000 members while local associations must 
have a "sufficient" number of members.184 
Before concluding this overview of the French public law of associations, 
one unusual feature should be noted, an anomaly which suggests a greater 
suspicion of private associations in public life than in the American or German 
cases.  In the United States, associations are generally not required to register 
with the public authorities unless they wish to claim tax-exempt status.  In 
Germany, voluntary associations (Vereine)-- among the most common are sports 
clubs and singing clubs--are required to register with the local court 
(Amtsgericht), which keeps what is called the Register of Associations 
(Vereinsregister).  Registration confers the association with legal personality, 
enabling the association to enter into contracts, buy property, appear in court, 
receive gifts and bequests, and engage in other legal relations under the Civil 
Code.  The requirements are minimal: associations must have at least seven 
members and file articles of association that cover certain matters.185 
The French registration scheme is more elaborate and demanding than in 
either the American or German cases.  In the 1800s, the Penal Code required that 
all associations with over twenty members obtain authorization from the state or 
face stiff criminal penalties.186  In 1901, the Penal Code provision was replaced 
with a law, which still exists in a substantially modified form today.  That law 
establishes three types of associations, each of which is subject to a progressively 
more stringent form of public supervision:  non-declared, declared, and public 
purpose associations.  Any group of two or more persons can form a non-
declared association without registering with the authorities by adopting a set of 
by-laws (statuts) to govern their activities.  In the past, such associations were at a 
disadvantage because they could not appear in court to challenge administrative 
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acts or enter into contracts; today, non-declared associations generally enjoy 
these basic rights before the courts.  The second type--declared associations--can 
hold property, enter into contracts, and litigate in their own name.  Such 
associations must file certain information with the local prefect (préfet) 187 and 
must maintain a special register in which they note all significant acts of the 
association, to be presented on demand to the authorities.188   
We have already seen the third type of association--public purpose 
associations--in the discussion of associational litigation.  These citizen 
associations are significantly different from the previous two, both in the 
activities they can undertake and the degree of state supervision they undergo.189  
Public purpose associations are entitled to receive donations and bequests and 
may, depending on whether the law sets down additional requirements, bring 
the public interest litigation described earlier.  To qualify, an association is 
required to file an application with the Ministry of Interior.  The decision to grant 
the application is based on a number of criteria: the association pursues the 
general interest (intérêt général); its the scope of action extends beyond the purely 
local; it has a significant number of members; it has sufficient resources; and it 
has existed for at least three years.190  Once an association is approved, it must 
keep its books and premises open for inspection and it must file annual reports 
with the authorities.191 
The common wisdom among legal scholars is that the original statutory 
scheme was driven by the fear of "the triumph of particular interests over the 
general interest" and the desire to prevent private associations from competing 
with the state.192  The intent was to curb the accumulation of property and power 
outside of the state.  French politics has long since lost this Rousseau-tinted 
hostility towards citizen associations, but the fact of state regulation of such 
associations remains--regulation that does not exist in the United States or 
Germany. 
What, then, are the understandings, preferences, and beliefs that sustain 
the republican system of citizen associations in democratic decisionmaking?  In 
republican democracy, the law, through liberal rights of free expression and 
association, creates an ample public sphere in which citizens can join together 
and debate the issues of the day.  The law, however, does not afford citizen 
groups the same opportunities to influence legislators and bureaucrats as in 
pluralism and corporatism, nor does the law afford the same opportunities to 
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influence judges as in pluralism.  That is because, unlike Germany, interest 
associations are believed to pursue narrow and selfish aims. 193  And, unlike the 
United States, the response to this understanding of interest is to exclude private 
associations from lawmaking and administration and to screen them before they 
can appear in court.  The response is not, as in the United States, to open the 
doors of government to all interests so that they can check and balance one 
another.  In republican democracy, no matter how many different associations 
and interests are called to participate in politics, they are not believed capable of 
transcending their particularities  and constituting the people.   
The French idea of democracy can be traced to the political theory of 
Rousseau as popularized in the Jacobean phase of the French Revolution.  
According to this version of Rousseau, citizens owed their primary allegiance to 
the Republic and had to ratify, directly, all laws of the Republic.  All other 
loyalties based on the Church, status and trade were considered illegitimate.194  
Obviously, French democracy has changed considerably since then.  Yet, through 
public law and political thought, some of the basic principles have survived.195  
Citizens do not wish to participate in politics through the intermediary of 
interest groups and interest group elites to the same extent as their pluralist 
cousins, nor do they believe that a political community in which such interest 
politics prevail is a viable one, not to speak of a good one.  
The rejection of interest groups in the daily government activities of 
lawmaking, administration, and judging is related to the importance attached to 
the democratic institutions of voting, parties, and elected officials.  At the center 
of the French legal system is not the Constitution nor the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, but la loi--parliamentary statutes—because all citizens are 
believed to be able to participate in their making, either personally or through 
their elected representatives.196   As Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man says:      
The law is the expression of the general will.  All citizens have 
the right to contribute personally or through their 
representatives to their making. 
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Glorification of la loi, like suspicion of interest groups, bears the heavy imprint of 
the French Revolution and the active citizenship ideal.  It certainly does not 
represent contemporary French democratic theory. Yet this understanding still 
informs the types of activities that French citizens value in public life—voting 
rather than lobbying and other forms of interest group activity.  Moreover, the 
primacy of voting  and parliamentary assemblies in French political thought is 
linked to beliefs about the dangerous consequences of downgrading elections to 
one among many other of political activity, of the same importance as 
membership in interest associations.    
Finally, even more so than corporatist democracy, French citizens inhabit 
a political world in which the state has a high capacity for action.  The ideology 
of la loi is combined today with a strong executive branch characteristic of 
parliamentary systems and a centralized bureaucracy.  In France, the 
government is even more powerful than in Germany, where important social 
and economic interests can delay or stop public policy initiatives, and where the 
Constitutional Court and federalism impose considerable constraints.  Once the 
French Prime Minister and President (if of the same party) are elected into office, 
they can carry out their mandate rapidly, free from some of institutional checks 
that characterize the American and French systems. 
My account of republican democracy, even more so than of pluralist and 
corporatist democracy, is highly stylized.  As the French law of citizen 
associations illustrates, even the constitutional system that typifies republicanism 
today departs dramatically from the ideal type and allows private associations to 
influence significantly the daily workings of government.  Yet that does not 
mean that the different law and culture of democracy has been eradicated.  As 
the changing French law of associational standing demonstrates, even though a 
republican democracy might come to permit more associational participation in 
law enforcement, it does so through a uniquely republican set of legal practices: 
the interest that was considered particular is rendered general through the 
intervention of the state and the recognition that the association serves the 
general interest. 
At the risk of slipping into caricature, the differences that separate 
contemporary democracies on the appropriate role for private associations in 
public life can be summarized as follows.  When an American gazes across the 
Atlantic she sees capture by special interests in Germany, authoritarianism in 
France.  When a German or Frenchman looks in the direction of her American 
cousins, she sees anarchy in which, ultimately, the most powerful economic 
interests prevail.  
The Role for Civil Society in Global Democracy 
 It is time to return to the questions from the beginning of the Article.  
Should World Bank executive directors and civil servants be required to solicit 
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the reaction of civil society before they approve loans?  Should environmental 
groups and others be called upon to participate in the work of the WTO's 
Committee on Trade and the Environment?  How should the Constitutional 
Treaty provision on civil society consultation in the European Union be 
interpreted?  In sum, what should be the role of civil society in a democratic 
system of global governance?   
 The comparative law of democracy shows that each of these questions 
can be answered in at least one of three ways:  all, some, or none of the 
associations between the state and the market should be entitled to participate in 
the institutions of global governance.  Appreciation and tolerance of legitimate 
differences on the civil society question and self-awareness of the inevitable bias 
that comes from being a citizen of one of the many cultures of democracy, is the 
first lesson to draw from this analysis.  But for those wrestling with the issue in 
the global arena, for whom this conclusion is not particularly satisfying, we can 
go one step further.    
Following the lead of critical theory, we might predict that American 
governmental and non-governmental actors will foist their pluralist model on 
institutions of global governance, using their power and resources as citizens of 
the hegemon.197  Indeed, the recent history of international organizations contains 
some evidence of such attempts at transforming the law in America's image.  In 
the negotiations on Chinese accession to the WTO, the United States demanded, 
successfully, that China introduce domestic administrative law reforms that 
would approximate the participation rights contained in the U.S. Administrative 
Procedure Act.198  When the European Commission circulated a proposed set of 
guidelines on civil society consultation, the U.S. government replied that the 
guidelines should apply, without exception, to all Commission initiatives, should 
never be used to favor certain groups over others, and should be enforceable in 
the courts.  In other words, the U.S. government replied that the European 
Union, like China, should adopt the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act.199  The 
European Commission, unlike China, said "no."   
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From a critical perspective, a successful bid to transpose American-style 
pluralist participation to the international realm would constitute an act of 
exclusion.  Of whom?  First, the same individuals and groups that are 
disadvantaged by pluralist institutions in domestic, American politics.  But 
understanding precisely which groups are systematically advantaged and 
disadvantaged by the configuration of rights and procedures in a pluralist order 
is not a simple task.  Take one piece of the American pluralism, notice and 
comment rulemaking.  Mark Seidenfeld and Cass Sunstein separately argue that 
American rulemaking furthers the ideals of deliberative democracy, that is, 
reasoned public deliberation among the citizens, bureaucrats, and judges 
involved in rulemaking.200  According to Seidenfeld and Sunstein, affected 
citizens put forward their concerns, administrators listen and respond based on 
the universalist grounds of good scientific evidence and the enabling statute's 
overall policy goals, and the courts oversee the entire process to ensure that the 
bureaucrats are deciding based on public reasons.  This procedure stops citizens 
from putting forward narrow, self-interested arguments and stops bureaucrats 
from striking deals that satisfy the most powerful participants in the process.   
Not so, argues Thomas McGarity.  American rulemaking in his view 
"works to the advantage of powerful entrenched economic interests."201  Why is 
this the case?  Regulated business is more likely to take part in rulemaking in the 
first place.202  The interest of economic actors is to delay the promulgation of 
rules since the later they must comply, the less they must spend.  Moreover, 
trade associations and firms have the resources necessary to participate 
effectively, resources which are generally lacking in the public interest sector.  
Lastly, the American judges that enforce such procedural rights on judicial 
review impose the demanding standard of "comprehensive analytical 
rationality."  Regulators can rarely meet this standard because they operate in the 
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real world of scientific uncertainty, unquantifiable benefits, and practical and 
political difficulties in pursuing certain policy alternatives.    
Even supposing Sunstein, Seidenfeld, and McGarity were able to agree on 
whether American pluralist rulemaking systematically favored certain interests 
over others, their assessment might vary over time.   For instance, the low 
capacity for state action in pluralist systems might make redistributive measures 
more difficult to enact than elsewhere, yet once in place, that very same inability 
to act might make it more difficult to dismantle the welfare state.203  To return to 
the initial point, understanding the injustice caused by the different laws of 
democracy is a formidable endeavor. 
Easier to assess is the exclusion of other cultures of democracy that would 
result from the adoption of a pluralist model.  The choice of pluralism would 
inevitably exclude corporatism and republicanism.  A number of political 
scientists have explored this phenomenon in the context of the European Union, 
where a common set of European institutions and laws are superimposed on 
different national cultures of democracy.  Predictably, the political scientists 
prefer the term "fit" to "repression" but the idea is quite similar.  They argue that 
the better the fit between the structure of European governance and the national 
political system, the smaller the transformation in domestic processes; vice versa, 
the poorer the fit, the greater the transformation.204  Yet even the more significant 
changes that have occurred in the "misfit" countries do not appear to be 
particularly troubling.  Countries such as France have witnessed a decline in 
executive branch power, an increase in the powers of the judiciary, and an 
expansion of the prerogatives of regional government in relation to central 
government.205  One set of constitutional practices is replaced with another set, 
both of which have good and bad consequences for democratic ideals.   
 Political scientists have also observed that government and private actors 
from "misfit" countries must adapt more extensively than actors from "fit" 
countries to operate effectively in the different institutional environment of 
Brussels.  Interest participation is one area in which European procedures and 
institutions differ from national democratic practices.  With the many 
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opportunities it affords for interest group participation, the European Union is a 
"quasi-pluralist" polity.206  Vivien Schmidt argues that because French organized 
interests come from a republican tradition in which they have few opportunities 
to influence policymaking, they have had difficulties mobilizing and pressing 
their agendas in Brussels.207  By contrast, German organized interests have 
significant experience with this form of democracy, coming from a corporatist 
system in which intermediate associations regularly shape public policy, and 
therefore they have been quite successful in Brussels.  From an equity 
perspective, this is troubling. 
Yet it appears that even this well-established form of exclusion caused by 
adopting one model of democracy over the others is quickly overcome.  
According to Schmidt, national actors have not wasted much time in adapting to 
the new realities of European politics; today, even French organized interests are 
quite adept at getting their way in Brussels.208  Moreover, as was stressed at the 
outset of the discussion of the different models of associational participation, 
none of them is monolithic even within the country believed to exemplify the 
model; therefore, in certain policy areas, domestic actors may very well be 
familiar with the alternative mode of democracy.  There is an even more basic 
reason for not taking this form of exclusion too seriously: when a regional or 
global political space emerges and a single set of constitutional rules must be 
devised, such rules will inevitably depart more radically from some national 
constitutional practices than others.  If the World Bank or the WTO were to resist 
the pressure to Americanize and were to decide that civil society participation 
should be organized along the lines of German corporatism, a culture would still 
be excluded, just a different one.  International organizations and global regimes 
are indispensable, but they also have costs. 
How are national officials and international bureaucrats to make a 
principled choice among the different models?  Recall that, in the discussion of 
the public law of interest accommodation, the values and beliefs sustaining that 
public law were identified.  While it may very well be impossible to say whether 
these popular theories of democracy are right or wrong when they operate in the 
native soil of a national community, we can inquire whether their beliefs find 
support in the empirics of emerging global communities.  
Citizens in pluralist democracies value competition among multiple 
interests and identities; they believe that public welfare can emerge from this 
form of political engagement.  In the global realm, however, it appears that 
commercial interests mobilize more than other types of interests and that citizens 
of northern countries band together in associations more than their counterparts 
in southern countries.  Many observers believe that multinational corporations 
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and business lobbies, with their superior financial resources, are better organized 
than public interest groups.209  Similarly, northern NGOs significantly outnumber 
southern NGOs.210  To speak with the language and metaphors of the pluralist 
tradition, special interest not pluralist competition is the reality of global politics; 
international institutions would be captured by corporate interests and public 
interests from the North.  In the new terrain of global governance, adopting the 
public law of pluralism would fall short of the aspirations of that law.  
Citizens in republican democracies believe that directly elected officials 
should be at the center of public life, with little interference from private 
associations or other institutional actors.  Research on regional and global 
regimes, however, has shown that when power is transferred to the global realm, 
national voters, parties, parliaments, and even leaders of executive branches, lose 
control.211   Regulators and politicians who make decisions in institutions of 
global governance do so largely free of party and parliamentary oversight.  
Under these conditions, republican laws and institutions that would permit 
global policymakers to exclude non-state actors could not hope to achieve the 
ideals of representative democracy that underpin such constitutions.  
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Corporatist democracy's balance between associationalism and elected 
officials is better-suited to the global politics of today.  Given the separation 
between public officials in the global sphere and voters and elected politicians in 
the national realm, such officials should be required to solicit the views of 
associations.  The case for interest representation in international organizations 
would hold even in the face of a cosmopolitan Global People's Assembly.  A 
directly elected assembly, or a series of such assemblies in specific international 
regimes, would be unlikely to satisfy current understandings of democratic 
representation.  A global assembly's world-wide scale, together with the practical 
limits on the assembly's size, would mean that each legislator would represent 
an enormous constituency.  Such a distance between voters, their representatives, 
and the assembly's collective output would test severely the contemporary 
concept of representative democracy.  Therefore, even a cosmopolitan 
international order--one that served global citizens, not states--would need to 
supplement the public law of French-style republican democracy with other 
institutions.  One possibility would be an elaborate, federalist system of local, 
national, regional, and global assemblies with carefully allocated powers.  
Another is the one explored in this Article--representation of citizens based not 
on territory, but on common interests and identities.  
Representation of interest should follow a corporatist, not pluralist, mold.  
Unlike pluralist democracies, resources are so unevenly distributed in global 
politics that we cannot assume all will be able to mobilize and to compete, 
thereby generating the public good.  As in the corporatist tradition, international 
officials should seek to understand which associations represent significant social 
and economic forces and to take their views into account.  Public officials should 
take pains to ensure balance among those associations that can legitimately claim 
to represent large number of citizens, united by common social and economic 
interests.  Just because certain businesses, in some sectors of the economy, can 
command the profits necessary to organize at the international level, does not 
signify that they should have a special voice in global governance.  The same is 
true for professional advocacy groups that have the skills necessary to apply for 
foundation funding but do not have large memberships or that come from 
wealthy northern countries.  Not to say that such interest groups should be 
excluded from international policymaking.  Their views, however, should be 
moderated by those of other groups that do not have the resources to attend 
international treaty negotiations, lobby international regulatory committees, and 
file briefs before international tribunals. 
What shape might this form of mediated civil society participation take? 
As the reader will recall, the corporatist model--illustrated by the German 
system--enables intermediate associations to participate in policymaking through 
a number of procedures.  Committees of associational representatives are 
consulted on legislative and administrative measures; industry and professional 
associations are entrusted with regulatory functions, subject to requirements of 
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representation of outside groups and supervision by the courts; certain 
associations are allowed to enforce public interest statutes by bringing lawsuits.  
Let us conduct a thought experiment.  Transpose one piece of the corporatist 
model to one international organization: sector-specific advisory committees of 
associational representatives at the WTO.  Such committees could be created in 
areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, consumer policy, the environment, and 
development.  One example has been suggested by Dan Esty--an advisory 
committee of environmental and business interests that sits alongside the 
intergovernmental Committee on Trade and the Environment.  These civil 
society committees would be consulted on revisions to the WTO Agreements in 
WTO Ministerials and on interpretations of those agreements issued by the 
WTO's specialized intergovernmental committees.  Civil society committees 
would have a right to meet with government officials about proposals, to submit 
written papers on proposals, and to publish their reactions to the policies 
ultimately adopted; they would not have veto power or the power to vote.  
Government officials could reject their views but, to the extent that such views 
were well-substantiated, at the peril of public opprobium.   
Imagining this form of corporatist interest representation at the global 
level is difficult for a number of reasons, some of which are unique to an 
international setting, others of which are instrinsic to the corporatist model 
wherever it operates.  The most significant conceptual hurdle in making the 
transition from the domestic to the international realm is selecting the 
associations that would be entitled to representation.  How would the 
associations sitting on WTO advisory committees be chosen?  If governments 
were allowed to select from their national associations, then the moral premise of 
liberalism that has guided this entire analysis would suffer.  Many societies do 
not recognize liberalism's limits on state authority, limits that are vital to the 
existence of civil society.  For this reason, such societies are less likely to have 
interest associations.  Moreover, illiberal governments are likely to select 
associations that represent state interests, not independent social and economic 
interests.  But neither is the solution to give the task to an official in the WTO 
secretariat.  The whole point of corporatist interest representation is to enable 
significant social and economic forces to take part in public decisionmaking.  
What is "significant" cannot be decided by a civil servant sitting in Geneva, 
removed from the complicated social realities of different parts of the world.    
One provisional solution would be for regional organizations--the 
African Union, Organization of American States, Association of South East Asian 
Nations, and others--to appoint the civil society associations entitled to send 
representatives to WTO advisory committees.  Most regions of the world contain 
a number of different regimes, some more liberal than others; by requiring a 
group of states to come to agreement, the difficulty of creating liberal global 
governance out of illiberal states is reduced somewhat.  Moreover, this 
arrangement has the advantage of giving the choice to government officials 
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familiar with the local cultures to be represented.  Politicians and bureaucrats at 
the regional level should have a better understanding of their social and 
economic realities than civil servants in international bureaucracies.  Tasking 
regional organizations with the choice of associations would also have a practical 
advantage.  Each region could have the right to name four associations to each 
sector-specific committee.  This committee structure, with its natural limit on 
membership numbers, would render the deliberations of WTO advisory 
committees far more manageable than if members were chosen by individual 
states. 
Another set of challenges is related to the defects of corporatism 
domestically and the importance of  attempting to avoid such defects at the 
international level.  Again, at the heart of the matter is the selection of 
associations.  At any historical moment, it might be clear which social forces have 
mobilized successfully in democratic politics and hence are entitled to influence 
directly public policy.  But societies change.  The special rights fairly granted to 
certain groups and their associations at one point in time, might become unjust 
privileges at a future point in time.  As group members become preoccupied 
with new interests and identities and defect to other organizations, corporatist 
systems of interest representation can become obsolete.   One oft-cited example 
of this phenomenon is the continuing prominence of blue collar unions in 
European politics notwithstanding their dwindling  membership figures.  
Furthemore, any system that allows private associations to participate in 
policymaking, even a pluralist one, will lend state resources to those associations 
that succeed in advancing their goals through the process.  In corporatist systems 
this dynamic is more apparent than in pluralist ones--although not necessarily 
more prevalent--because certain groups are empowered by law to contribute to 
policymaking.  To avoid these defects, corporatist procedures at the international 
level should be designed to facilitate adaptation and flexibility.  Every five to ten 
years, on a staggered basis, regional organizations would be asked to review 
their appointment of associations to WTO advisory committees.  And to combat 
the danger of empowering, unfairly, one set of social actors over another set, 
regional organizations could be required to replace at least one out of their four 
associations during their periodic reviews. 
This thought experiment can also incorporate some of the policy 
implications of the political philosophy of civil society.  The goal of cosmopolitan 
mobilization should be taken into account in designing WTO advisory 
committees; trasnational associations should be represented too.  The WTO 
secretariat could be charged with the selection task.  Its civil servants are 
particularly well-placed to determine which associations are genuinely 
transnational in their activities and likely, therefore, to promote civic 
consciousness across national borders.  Certain criteria could guide the 
appointments process: for instance, transnational associations that count 50,000 
members in over thirty countries.  Finally, in line with corporatist systems 
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nationally, public funding for needy associations should be made available by 
the WTO and should be administered by the WTO secretariat.  The purpose of 
designing a corporatist committee system is to guarantee balance in a global 
community in which interest group activity appears imbalanced.  Ensuring that 
the members of such a committee system have the material resources necessary 
to participate effectively in committee work is part and parcel of creating the 
conditions for equal voice.  
The argument for mediating the influence of interest associations, based 
on the realities of transnational associational life and representative democracy, 
also holds true in the European Union.  Today the associational landscape of 
Brussels is more densely populated than before and a directly elected legislative 
assembly--the European Parliament--now exercises significant lawmaking and 
oversight responsibilities.  Nevertheless, the European political space continues 
to display some of same characteristics as purely international regimes.  Small, 
sector-specific industry associations and multinationals are better organized than 
nationwide employer associations, consumers groups, and human rights 
organizations.212  The European Parliament is directly elected but not directly 
accountable.  Citizens largely ignore the activities of their European 
parliamentarians; national politics and political identities still take precedence 
over the nascent pan-European public sphere.213  
National governments and the European Commission already play a 
significant role in deciding which associations should participate directly in 
policymaking.214  National governments choose the producer groups, labor 
unions, farmer organizations, and consumer associations that sit on the 
Economic and Social Committee.  The Commission selects the pan-European 
federations that sit on numerous issue-specific advisory committees.  This 
tradition of interest mediation should inform the Principle of Participatory 
Democracy guaranteed under Article I-47 of the Constitutional Treaty.  European 
Courts should be wary of interpreting Article I-47 as a legal right to comment on 
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Alasdair R. Young eds., 1997) (describing organizational difficulties of European consumer 
movement). 
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public policy measures, available to all citizens and their associations and 
enforceable in the courts.  This would come close to the law of pluralist 
democracy and may not be suited to the realities of European governance.  
Rather, to further the cosmopolitan ideal, associations that have numerous 
members scattered throughout Europe and that seek to encourage debate on 
European political issues should play an important policymaking role.  
Moreover, the organizations that national governments deem important in 
public life because of their long-standing histories and membership figures--
some of which already sit on the Economic and Social Committee--should be 
given special consideration in European legislative and administrative processes.  
In designing civil society participation, global policymakers should bear 
in mind that just as patterns of interest representation vary significantly within 
national systems of government, different forms of accommodation might be 
appropriate across international organizations or international policy areas.  For 
instance, certain issues might provoke such extensive global mobilization that 
pluralist institutions are appropriate.  Or national legislatures and executive 
branches might track certain forms of global governance so carefully that it 
might be proper to limit the role of civil society, as in the republican model.  Or 
the public's desire for swift and decisive government action might be such that 
civil society participation should be restricted. 
Conclusion 
For global politics to become democratic politics, it is critical that citizens 
throughout the world debate and band together on the issues being decided in 
the many sites of global governance. Yet that basic liberal intuition does not 
necessarily support the conclusion that the associations through which citizens 
mobilize should participate in policymaking.  This Article demonstrates that 
liberal theories of civil society advance the cause of specific types of associations: 
local associations with grassroots followings in the social capital and 
communitarian schools of thought and transnational membership associations 
for cosmopolitans.  Ongoing reform efforts in organizations like the World Bank 
and the WTO should pay special attention to these forms of civil society. 
Architects of international organizations can also draw inspiration from 
national experiences with democracy.  Democratic societies have devised at least 
three ways of accommodating interest and identity groups in public life:  
pluralism, corporatism, and republicanism.  Each embodies a specific set of 
values and beliefs about public life.  Proving these popular theories of democracy 
right or wrong in their native soil is not feasible.  It is possible, however, to 
discern whether their belief systems have any purchase on the contemporary 
realities of politics in the international realm.  In a global world of poorly 
organized interests and ineffective electoral politics, the premises of neither the 
pluralist nor the republican models are satisfied.  The laws and institutions of 
pluralist and republican democracy, when transposed to this new global terrain, 
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would fall short of the ideals and aspirations of those political communities.  The 
public law of corporatist democracy is a good alternative.  Corporatist 
democracy's belief that only certain intermediate associations are legitimate 
participants in policymaking, alongside elected officials and civil servants, is 
better-suited to some of the realities of contemporary global politics. 
 
 
 
